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FALSITY, INSINCERITY, AND THE FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION
Mark Spottswood*
ABSTRACT
Three decades ago, the Supreme Court announced that false statements of fact
are devoid of constitutional value, without providing either a reasoned explanation
for that principle or any supporting citations. This assertion has become one of the
most frequently repeated dogmas of First Amendment law and theory, endlessly
repeated and never challenged. Disturbingly, this idea has provided the theoretic
foundation for a regime in which some speakers can be penalized for even honestly-
believed factual errors. Even worse, this dogma is flat wrong.
False statements often have value in themselves, and we should protect them even
in some situations where we are not concerned with chilling truthful speech. When
false statements are spoken sincerely, they are a useful and necessary part of
argumentation, which is a powerful means of increasing human knowledge. When
confronted with honest errors, proponents of competing beliefs have a natural impulse
to contest them; in so doing, they unearth and disseminate facts that deepen the under-
standing of both speakers and listeners. False speech, therefore, is valuable because
it is an essential part of a larger system that works to increase society's knowledge.
The benefits of false speech evaporate, however, when we move from honest
errors to deliberate lies. Insincere speech tends to corrode, rather than further,
argument. It is associated with a number of practices that deprive argument of its
knowledge-promoting features. We may sometimes wish to protect insincere speech
to avoid chilling truthful speech, but we should always do so cautiously.
After providing a summary of the existing law and scholarship concerning false
speech, this Article analyzes the harms and benefits of false, insincere, and misleading
speech. This question will be approached from the perspective of social veritistic
epistemology, which will permit a detailed assessment of the consequences of
various types of deceptive speech for the state of societal knowledge. I will
conclude by suggesting some ways in which existing First Amendment doctrine
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois. The author wishes to thank Professor Martin Redish for his
invaluable guidance and advice in the preparation of this Article; thanks also to Micah
Schwartzmann for his insight on the concept of sincerity. © 2008 by the Author. Permission
is hereby granted to duplicate this Article for scholarly or teaching purposes, including
permission to reproduce multiple copoies or post on the Internet for classroom use, subject
to the inclusion of this copyright notice, the title, and the name of the author.
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could be reformed in order to better account for the constitutional value of false
speech. Ultimately, it is insincerity, not falsity, which has "no essential part of any
exposition of ideas," and is of "slight social value as a step to truth." Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
Even a false statement may be deemed to make a valuable
contribution to public debate, since it brings about "the clearer
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its
collision with error."
-New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (quoting J.S. Mill) (1964)'
[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither
the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances
society's interest in "uninhibited, robust and wide-open" debate on
public issues.
-- Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974)2
INTRODUCTION
The two quotations above illustrate the confusion of the Supreme Court when
it has applied the Speech and Press Clauses3 to speech that is false, insincere, or
misleading. Sometimes the Court is willing to give quite strong protections to
speech that is false, as in the public official defamation context,4 while in other
contexts, such as restrictions on commercial speech, the Court has suggested that it
would not protect even innocent errors in public discourse.5 The most persistent
theme of the Court's decisions in this area, however, is a reluctance to proceed
beyond such superficial pronouncements and explain why the First Amendment
should, or should not, value speech that is untrue or insincere.
The confusion in the Court's treatment is mirrored in the scattered scholarship
on this issue. Although John Stuart Mill devoted considerable attention to the relation-
ship between a free speech principle and the social value of false speech,6 other scholars
noted the defects in his treatment almost immediately, especially the fact that he
examined examples of false speech in religious and political contexts to the exclusion
of examining discourse about "facts."7
376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964) (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON
LIIERTY AND OTHER WRrriNGs 5, 20 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989)).
2 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (citations omitted).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4 See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-86.
' See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
6 See MILL, supra note 1, at 19-55.
7 See JAMEs FIT7JAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNrrY 74-77 (R.J. White
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (2d ed. 1874); see also discussion infra Part I.B.1.
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Strikingly, Mill's project was never taken up where he left off; rather, modem
scholarly treatments of the relationship between free expression and falsity have
tended to whistle their way past important assumptions about the values of falsity
and insincerity in public discourse, rarely spending any time trying to justify or
assess the degree to which falsity in speech is detrimental to free speech values.8 As
a result, both modem case law and scholarship on the relationship between free
speech, falsity, and insincerity tend to be "casual, almost offhand," as Justice
Douglas once characterized the arbitrary decision to exclude all commercial speech
from First Amendment protection. 9 Thus, it is quite possible that these shallow
treatments, like the old rule on commercial speech, "[will] not survive[] reflection."' 0
It is the purpose of this Article to analyze the degree to which this might be the case.
This Article will, for the first time, undertake a detailed analysis of the harms
and benefits that can flow from the various types of deceptive speech, including
false speech (speech which does not accurately describe the world), insincere speech
(speech which misrepresents a speaker's belief), and misleading speech (speech
which may be literally true but which carries false or insincere implications). In this
analysis, I will employ the tools of social veritistic epistemology" in order to assess
when these types of speech are likely to increase the total number of false beliefs
held by speakers and listeners. This epistemological approach has the capacity to
illuminate questions that have remained obscure for some time.
The thesis of this Article is that speech that is false but sincerely believed by its
utterer is generally protected by the First Amendment because such speech generally
promotes the growth of social knowledge. Insincere speech, however, is excluded
from First Amendment protection in almost all cases because it tends to inhibit, rather
than promote, the increase of knowledge. Finally, misleading speech receives constitu-
tional protection to the degree that its implied meanings represent what a speaker
believes, whether or not those beliefs are false; it is only the insincere use of implied
meanings that excludes speech from protection. However, this type of exception
should only exist when the implied meaning of the speech is insincere, not merely when
inferences might be drawn from a statement that would not be believed by the speaker.
The common theory tying all of these claims together is that the practice of
good-faith argumentation by proponents of competing views is generally more
conducive to the increase of knowledge than a regime that suppresses views that are
probably false (when certain supporting conditions are met).' 2 In other words, the
8 See discussion infra Parts I.B.2-3.
9 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
10 Id.
" See ALvIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SocLAL WORLD 4-5 (1999) (defining and
discussing this term).
12 See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing the Truth-in-Evidence Principle and its
relationship with defeater argumentation).
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best way to arrive at true judgments is to listen to argument by proponents of
opposing beliefs, rather than making an initial judgment on the validity of the
question and suppressing contrary viewpoints. To the degree we believe that the
First Amendment is designed to promote the growth of human knowledge, 3 such
considerations point towards recognizing constitutional value in all sincere speech,
whether or not it is false. But even if we reject such a view, an assessment of the
degree to which false speech can advance our knowledge is critical if we wish to
accurately compare the harm of protecting false speech with the harm of prohibiting it.
This Article will proceed in several parts. Part I will survey the existing case
law and scholarship on the degree to which the First Amendment protects speech
that is false or insincere. In this survey, I shall attempt to show that these sources
are notable more for their gaps than for their broad coverage and that neither courts
nor legal scholars have grappled directly with the question of how much harm false,
insincere, or misleading speech causes. Next, in Part 1I, I shall attempt to provide
a conceptual framework for a careful analysis of the relationship between free
speech, falsity, and insincerity, drawing on basic concepts from legal scholarship,
epistemology, and the philosophy of language to create a foundation on which to
build a theory. In Part I, I will argue that false speech that is sincerely uttered
should receive broad and categorical constitutional protection, subject to a few
narrow exceptions, based upon its capacity to increase our knowledge as a driver of
argumentation. In Part IV, I will explain why this conclusion does not extend to
speech that is insincere and demonstrate that insincere speech should be protected
only to the extent necessary to avoid chilling sincere speech. In Part V, I will address
the problem of misleading speech. Finally, in Part VI, I will offer some suggestions
of how modem First Amendment doctrine could be reformed so as to better reflect
the knowledge-promoting value of false speech.
I. THE MUDDLED STATE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THEORY ON FALSE AND
INSINCERE SPEECH
A. Case Law: Bright Line Rules in Search of a Justification
This Section will explore the current state of the law applying to claims
involving false, insincere, or misleading speech. After a brief flirtation with the idea
that false statements might be valuable in themselves,1 4 the Supreme Court has
largely espoused the principle that false speech should never be protected for its own
sake, but only to the extent that restricting false speech will chill truthful speech. 5
'3 See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OFFREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1978).
14 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964).
'5 See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
771-72 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
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It has explored this idea in two primary contexts: the regulation of commercial speech
and the regulation of defamation. However, although the Court has certainly been
clear about false speech's lack of value, there are two reasons to doubt the validity
of this dogma: first, the Court has spent little time attempting to justify or explain
the reasoning underlying the rule, and second, the Court has rarely needed to test its
commitment to it.
1. Defamation and False Light Privacy Cases
The Court's first significant treatment of false speech 6 came in New York Times
v. Sullivan, a case in which the Court announced that defamation liability is signifi-
cantly constrained by the First Amendment.17 Sullivan held that false speech about
public officials only gives rise to liability when made with actual malice, a state of
mind involving either knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.' 8 The
Court later clarified that "reckless disregard," in this usage, means that a speaker
subjectively believed that what he said was probably false.'9 In other words, speech
about public persons must be both false and insincere (not believed by the speaker)
before it can be penalized.
The Court based this new rule on two key premises. The first and primary
concern was the inevitability of false statements in free debate and the need to
protect some such statements in order to prevent freedom of expression from being
chilled.2' The Court rejected the argument that the chilling effect could be effectively
defrosted by the common law defense of truth because even truly believed statements
can be chilled by the threat of expensive lawsuits and the doubt that a statement can
be proven true in court.2' As the Court reasoned, those who had only a defense of
truth available would "tend to make only statements which 'steer far wider of the
unlawful zone. "22
The second premise involved the inherent value of speech that is false, rather
than the dangers of chilling true speech. In a footnote, the Court noted that false
16 The Court had previously offered a few dicta on the subject, but these seemed more
concerned with whether commercial speech deserved protection than whether false speech
did. See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (noting in passing that
"[fIrauds may be denounced as offenses and punished by law").
17 376 U.S. 254.
18 Id. at 279-80. The rule was later extended to public figures as well as public officials.
See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45 (enunciating a distinction between private and public figure
plaintiffs for First Amendment purposes).
'9 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731-33 (1968).
20 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-72.
21 Id. at 279.
22 Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
1207
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
statements had an intrinsic value in public discourse.23 Although it gave the point
little discussion, the Court cited with approval John Stuart Mill's argument that false
speech has value in itself, because "it brings about 'the clearer perception and
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.' 24 Thus, Sullivan
gave strong protection to some false statements that are made sincerely in order to
protect both false speech and true.
Although Sullivan had been decided without a single dissent, it was not long
before the Court retreated from its position on the value of false speech. Just ten
years later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court held that false statements regarding
private persons received less protection than statements about public figures or
officials.25 Rather than an actual malice test, the Court held that false statements
about private persons could be punished so long as states did not impose liability
without fault. 26 This has been taken to impose a rule requiring at least negligent
publication of a falsehood before liability can be imposed. 7
More importantly for the purposes of this Article, Gertz signaled a sharp shift
in the Court's stated attitude toward the constitutional value of falsity. In strong
contrast to Sullivan, which had stated that false statements made "a valuable contribu-
tion to public debate, '28 the Gertz Court stated that
there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither
the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances
society's interest in "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate
on public issues. They belong to that category of utterances which
"are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
23 Id. at 279 n.19.
24 Id. It is possible, of course, that the Court only intended this statement to apply to false
statements about value laden subjects such as ethics and religion. Indeed, the main sources
cited in support of this rule, Mill's On Liberty and Milton's Areopagitica, cited only examples
of ethical or religious speech in support of their enunciations of a free expression principle
that included false speech, so such a limitation would not be totally surprising. See MILL,
supra note 1, at 19-53; JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica, in JOHN MILTON: COMPLETE POEMS
AND MAJOR PROSE 716, 717, 728-29 (Merritt Y. Hughes ed., 1957).
25 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
26 Id. at 347. Because Gertz involved speech on a matter of public concern, it remains
unclear whether the requirement of fault extends to defamatory statements about private
figures involving matters of solely private concern. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985) (limiting other aspects of the Gertz rule to cases
involving matters of public concern); ERWINCHEMERINSKY, CONSTIrUTIONALLAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 1018 (2d ed. 2002) (stating that the Court has never resolved this question).
27 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B cmt. c (1977) ("It is clear also that
negligence will likewise meet the constitutional requirement, though a lesser degree of fault
probably would not.").
28 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 n.19.
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slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality." 29
Thus, the Gertz Court repudiated the reasoning in Sullivan that false statements
are valuable in themselves, stating instead that error was "inevitable in free debate"
and should be protected only because of the risk of inducing self-censorship.30 At
no point did the Gertz Court address the footnote argument from Sullivan asserting
the opposite.3' Moreover, Gertz cited no authority or scholarship that would provide
an argumentative foundation for this conclusion; rather it merely rebutted the shallowly
supported assertion in Sullivan with an equally conclusory counter-assertion.32
Although Gertz is largely notable for its limitation on the protection that the
Supreme Court will afford to false speech, it simultaneously established a rule that
gave very strong protection to some false speech. In a little-explained comment, the
Court noted that "there is no such thing as a false idea" and that therefore "opinions"
were completely immunized from liability and must be rebutted by the competition
of other ideas, not by law.33 Subsequent cases have shed only a little light on the fairly
opaque distinction between facts and opinions. The inquiry, generally, is a highly
contextual examination of the degree to which a statement is ambiguous versus
definite in meaning, the degree to which it is verifiable, and the degree to which its
context indicates that a reader should infer that it has factual content. 34 To the
degree that a statement is significantly ambiguous, unverifiable, and seemingly
unlikely to represent facts, it is deemed to be an opinion rather than a fact for
constitutional purposes.35
Thus, the Supreme Court's defamation jurisprudence teaches that sincere but false
speech sometimes needs constitutional protection in order to prevent truthful speech
from being chilled, while consistently holding that insincere speech can be regu-
lated.36 At the same time, however, the Court has wavered on whether false speech
29 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270; Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)) (citations omitted).
30 Id. at 340-41.
31 Id.
32 The only citations used for the Gertz Court's proposition that false statements had no
constitutional value were Sullivan, which argued the opposite, and Chaplinsky, which addressed
the category of fighting words, not false or insincere speech. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
13 Id. at 339-40.
31 See, e.g., Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970,979 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
35 Id.
36 The only notable case dissenting from the viewpoint that outright lies fall outside the
protections of the First Amendment is State v. 119 Vote No! Committee, 957 P.2d 691, 693
(Wash. 1998). In 119 Vote No!, the Washington Supreme Court held that a statute outlawing
false statements made with actual malice nevertheless violated the First Amendment when
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is valuable in itself and has provided shockingly little defense for either position in
the cases most directly addressing false statements of fact.
The tort of false light invasion of privacy, which permits plaintiffs to recover for
highly offensive false statements made about them, 37 is similar to the much older tort
of defamation. Thus, it is unsurprising that in the few cases to consider the First
Amendment limits on false light actions, the Supreme Court has followed principles
it established in its defamation jurisprudence. Thus, in Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Supreme
Court held that the actual malice rule of Sullivan also applies to false light claims
for reasons very similar to those articulated in Sullivan.38 In reaching this result, the
Hill Court referred specifically to the risk that restrictions on sincerely believed false
statements would chill the expression of true statements. 39 The Court, however,
made no reference to the possibility that false speech might be valuable in itself.4'
Thus, the false light cases, though a significant area in which First Amendment law
has been applied to false speech, give us little additional insight into the degree to
which false speech has constitutional value in itself, although they do reaffirm the
conclusion that a concern for chilling effects is a legitimate reason to protect
sincerely-believed false speech.4'
applied to speech that did not defame any individual but merely served to mislead the public
generally. Id. at 696-97. However, 119 Vote No! remains something of an aberration; as a
general matter, other courts addressing the constitutionality of election fraud statutes tend to
hold that a Sullivan-like actual malice standard applies. See, e.g., Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401
F. Supp. 87,88,91-93 (S.D.N.Y & E.D.N.Y) (applying actual malice standard to New York
election fraud statute and striking down portions that restricted false political speech made
without actual malice), affd, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976); Dowling v. Ala. State Bar, 539 So. 2d
149, 151-53 (Ala. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1081 (1989); Snortland v. Crawford, 306
N.W.2d 614, 622-23 (N.D. 1981).
17 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
38 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 386-89 (1967). The continuing validity of this
holding, as applied to false light claims brought by private individuals, has been placed in
some doubt by the holding in Gertz, although the Court has so far declined to address
whether Gertz has altered the rule in Hill. See Cantrell v. Forest City Pub. Co., 419 U.S. 245,
250-51 (1974) (declining to consider whether Gertz altered the applicable standard); Russell
G. Donaldson, Annotation, False Light Invasion of Privacy, 57 A.L.R.4th 22, 39-47 (1987)
(noting the continuing disagreement among lower courts as to whether Gertz had the effect
of altering the rule from Hill and surveying relevant cases).
39 385 U.S. at 388-89.
40 See id.
"' The Court has used the defamation doctrines as a template for addressing other areas of
false speech law as well, with a similar lack of further development. See Illinois ex rel. Madigan
v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600,611-12,619-21 (2003) (applying defamation-like
principles of First Amendment protection to a fraud action against telemarketers engaged in
charitable solicitations); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61-62 (1982) (applying similar
principles to an action grounded upon allegedly false statements made during an election
campaign).
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2. Commercial Speech Cases
There is one other area of doctrine in which false speech has figured significantly
in First Amendment law: the Court's commercial speech cases. These cases give
limited constitutional protection to commercial speech but deny all protection to
commercial speech that is false or misleading without regard for a speaker's state
of mind. The exclusion of all false or misleading commercial speech was first
suggested in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council.42 After the Virginia Board Court announced its new rule providing for the
protection of commercial speech, it took pains to assure the public that its rule would
not sweep away the bulk of then-existing commercial regulations, including those
rules devoted to outlawing fraudulent business practices.43
The Court, in dicta, stated that the new protection it announced would not
extend to speech that was false, deceptive, or misleading.' Citing to Gertz, the
Court announced that untruthful speech had never been protected for its own sake.45
Furthermore, the Court assured the public that the states would also be permitted to
regulate speech that "is not provably false, or even wholly false, but only deceptive
or misleading."'  Thus, the Court's description of unprotected commercial speech
involves a much broader swath of false speech than did the rules in Sullivan and
Gertz, which required at least recklessness or negligence, respectively.
Although it relied on Gertz' s assertion that false speech had no constitutional value,
the Virginia Board Court made no effort to support that assertion with a firmer
argumentative foundation. Other than Gertz itself, the Court cited only a footnote from
Konigsberg v. State Bar,47 a footnote that stands for the widely accepted principle that
the Speech and Press Clauses guarantee rights that are qualified rather than absolute
and can be overcome by significantly strong countervailing policy interests. 48
Soon after Virginia Board was decided, the Court in Central Hudson set forth
a general test to determine when commercial speech is protected.49 Unsurprisingly,
42 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
41 Id. at 770-73.
44 Id. at 771.
" Once again, the court did not cite or discuss the contrary statements in Sullivan. Id.;
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964).
46 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771.
41 Id. (citing Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961)).
48 Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 49 n.10. Although Konigsberg does note that an absolutist
reading of the First Amendment might well be inconsistent with much of the modem law that
regulates falsity, it makes no effort to explain why a qualified First Amendment that incorporates
a balancing component either does or does not protect false or insincere speech. Id.
" Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
563-65 (1980).
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all inaccurate speech was categorically excluded.50 In the Court's formulation of the
test, the government may ban commercial expression whenever it is "more likely to
deceive the public than to inform it."'" Although this part of the test was dicta,52 it
nevertheless has had an enormous impact on the content of the First Amendment law
of commercial speech, as the Central Hudson test forms the backbone of all modem
law in this area. 3
Given the centrality of this test, it is worthwhile to look at the Court's reasons
for treating commercial falsity so differently from the non-commercial false speech
discussed above. The Court based its conclusion that the First Amendment did not
protect inaccurate commercial speech on the assumption that the protection of
commercial speech was related solely to its "informational function. 54 Thus, the
Court's logic was that inaccurate speech does not advance the amount of valuable
information available to the public. This reasoning makes sense if one has already
concluded that false speech has no informational value, but it does not provide any
new support for that position. Critically, there was no analysis of whether a regime
permitting argument by proponents of both true and false beliefs would yield more
informational increase than a rule allowing the government to suppress the false side
of the argument. Nor did the Court cite to any new sources dissecting the constitutional
value of false speech; although the Court did refer to two commercial speech cases,
Friedman v. Rogers5 and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,56 neither case
addressed the value of false speech in itself, separated from the dangers of insincerity."7
50 Id.
51 Id. at 563.
52 Central Hudson did not involve an allegation that the commercial speech at issue was
false. See id. at 560, 566 ('The Commission does not claim that the expression at issue...
is inaccurate.").
" See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 1049-50 (describing the Supreme Court's persistent
reliance on the Central Hudson case in modem commercial speech cases).
' Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
5 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
56 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
57 The Friedman Court's concern was not with all types of falsity in advertising, but
rather with a specific type: intentionally misleading practices designed to confuse consumers
about the identity and record of an optometry shop. 440 U.S. at 14. Thus, Friedman cannot
support a broad rule exempting all inaccurate commercial speech from constitutional protection.
Likewise, the Ohralik decision expressed a concern that "unsophisticated, injured, or distressed
lay person[s]" would tend to fall prey to coercion during in-person solicitations by lawyers,
who are after all "professional[s] trained in the art of persuasion." 436 U.S. at 465-66.
Ohralik did not involve any claims of false or inaccurate representations, and its prophylactic
rule is best read as expressing twin concerns about deliberate coercion or deception, on the
one hand, and protecting the privacy of accident victims, on the other. Id. at 452-54, 465-67.
Thus, neither case provides support for the conclusion that false speech is without constitutional
value absent the additional element of insincerity.
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The Court also noted that basing the regulability of commercial speech in part
on its accuracy introduced a content distinction into First Amendment law that was
arguably improper.58 To rebut this potential concern, the Court made two arguments
about why such content distinctions were appropriate. First, the Court noted that
"commercial speakers have extensive knowledge of both the market and their
products. Thus, they are well situated to evaluate the accuracy of their messages."59
Second, the Court noted that commercial speakers are motivated by economic self-
interest and thus are unlikely to be deterred by overbroad regulations.' In other words,
the Court had accepted the logic of Gertz that false statements should only be protected
when there is a danger of chilling true speech. Because it believed that there was
no such danger when the speaker is a commercial entity, the Court saw little reason
to protect false commercial speech.
Thus, after its brief flirtation in Sullivan with the idea that false statements might
be valuable in themselves, both the defamation cases and the doctrine of connercial
speech rely on a view of the Speech and Press Clauses in which false statements
have no intrinsic value even when spoken sincerely. Rather, the Court views false
statements as needing protection only when necessary to avoid chilling true speech.
As a result, it has crafted a varying array of protections for false speech in different
arenas based on its understanding of the risks of deterring true speech in each situation.
However, a close reading of the Court's cases in this area suggests that the Court
has conveniently ignored difficult questions of free expression theory. The Court
has rarely attempted to justify its assertions that false speech has no constitutional
value, preferring an approach that involves repeating the conclusion in the hopes
that saying it enough will make it true. The closest the Court has come to justifying
its position was when it argued in Central Hudson that false speech is inherently
harmful because it lacks useful informational content.6' Perhaps this epistemological
explanation of the harm of false speech could justify its exclusion-but the Supreme
Court has yet to take up the challenge of showing that to be the case. The next
Section will discuss the existing scholarly commentary on false, insincere, and
misleading speech to see whether this deficit has been adequately addressed in the
literature to date.
58 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6.
59 id.
60 Id. Both distinctions were drawn from language in Virginia Board. Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976). These
distinctions have been much criticized and are hard to defend on principle. See, e.g., Alex
Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627,
635-38 (1990). Indeed, it is hard to square the profit-motive distinction with the Court's
demonstration in Virginia Board that a wide variety of speech at the core of First Amendment
protections is uttered for pecuniary gain. See 425 U.S. at 761-63.
61 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
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B. The Underdeveloped State of False Speech Scholarship
The exclusion of false speech from First Amendment protection permits the
government to impose content-based restrictions on speech,62 a type of speech-
restriction that is typically subject to significant First Amendment limitations.63 Given
this special treatment, one might expect a significant amount of scholarly writing
either attempting to explain this exclusion or arguing that it is improper. Surprisingly,
this is not the case. Although early writers such as John Milton and John Stuart Mill
wrote specifically concerning the value of protecting speech that is false, their
arguments focused almost entirely on assertions of moral or religious claims rather
than false speech concerning more verifiable matters.
Subsequent writers have occasionally suggested some reasons for protecting
speech that is false but sincere. One category of such proposals has followed the
Supreme Court's concern that restricting false speech will end up suppressing some
true speech as well. The other strain has involved suggesting that we should generally
try and avoid penalizing speakers who speak what they believe in good faith for
reasons grounded in political theory, such as respect for the autonomy of speakers
or for their role as sovereigns in a democratic state. However, none of this scholarship
has given significant attention to a question at the core of this inquiry: what is the
specific harm caused by false or insincere speech? Without providing answers to
these questions, all of this scholarship skips an essential step, because without
assessing how harmful false speech is, we cannot appropriately decide when its
potential harm outweighs the benefits identified by scholars to date.
1. John Stuart Mill and the Values of False Speech
Many of the early writings on free expression argue that false speech should be
tolerated and protected alongside true speech. For instance, when John Milton wrote
his Areopagitica in opposition to the pervasive press licensing scheme enacted by
Parliament in 1643, 64 he based his argument in part on the need for enlightened
believers to encounter both truth and error in matters of religious belief.65 Likewise,
John Locke also wrote about the value of tolerating speech with which we disagree,
62 Id. at 564 n.6.
63 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) ("The First Amendment
generally prevents government from proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct, because
of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid."
(citations omitted)); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SoCIErIEs NEED DISSENT 99-102 (2003)
(noting that viewpoint discrimination is always disfavored, and content distinctions are
typically suspect).
4 See Merritt Y. Hughes, Biographical Note, in JOHN MILTON: COMPLETE POEMS AND
MAJOR PROSE, supra note 24, at 716.
65 See MILTON, supra note 24, at 717, 728-29.
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even when it is "false and absurd." 66 Locke wrote that: "[The] truth certainly
would do well enough, if she were once left to shift for herself.... [11f truth makes
not her way into the understanding by her own light, she will be but the weaker for
any borrowed force violence can add to her. 67
The force of these arguments is limited, however, by the fact that both men were
arguing in support of an explicitly religious premise: differences of opinion should
be tolerated because religious beliefs should be (and indeed can only be) formed by
choice and not by compulsion.68 Mill was the first writer to directly confront the
question of why false speech should be protected from a secular point of view.
In the second chapter of On Liberty, Mill set out to defend a broad rule prohibiting
all restrictions on public expression, regardless of the manner of expression, subject
only to a narrow exception for speech that proximately causes grave harms to others,
such as defrauding another person or inciting a mob to murder. 69 Fortunately for the
purposes of this Article, Mill assumes during his argument that the only reason we
might wish to suppress expression is because we believe it to be false. 70 This is
fortunate because it means that his argument addresses itself entirely to the benefits
and risks of restricting expression based upon its supposed falsity.
Mill's argument proceeds as follows: a message that the government wishes to
suppress must be either true or false, or it must combine shades of truth and falsity.7'
Mill analyzes each possibility in turn, attempting to demonstrate that in all situations
regulating speech on the basis of its falsity is improper.
First, Mill writes, we must be very cautious when restricting opinions we believe
to be false, because those opinions we think are wrong may in fact be true.72 As Mill
points out, suppressing speech because you believe it to be false assumes infallibility
on that question.7 3 And we should be very cautious about assuming such infallibility
66 JOHN LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 241 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 213 (framing his discussion as a response concerning the toleration of different
sects of Christianity); MILTON, supra note 24, at 728 (arguing that Christian faith would be
stronger if tested by the trial of reading evil writings).
619 See MILL, supra note 1, at 19-20 (stating a general rule against restraint of speech);
id. at 56 (excluding incitement from protection); see also id. at 95 (suggesting that fraudulent
speech may be excluded from protection). For a helpful discussion of Mill's argument, see
generally Lawrence B. Solum, Book Review, The Value of Dissent, 85 CORNELL L. REv.
859,876-79 (2000) (reviewing STEVEN H. SHLFFRN, DIssENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS
OF AMERICA (1999)).
70 MILL, supra note 1, at 20-21 (assuming that suppression will be based upon falsity);
see FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 22 (1982) (observing
that Mill so limits his argument).
71 See MILL, supra note 1, at 53-54.
72 Id. at 22-25.
73 Id.
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because history is replete with examples of doctrines widely assumed to be true even
by the best and wisest of men but later believed to be false with equal vigor.74
Second, Mill argues that even knowably false speech has value because it
promotes "the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its
collision with error."75 In other words, what is problematic about stifling false speech
is that it deprives us of the opportunity and necessity of marshaling reasons for what
we believe and of having to use reason to decide which among competing theories
are true.76 According to Mill, having an opinion without understanding its underlying
justification is not very useful.77 Under such conditions, both individuals and societies
eventually forget both the basis for their beliefs and the meaning of those beliefs,
and a "living truth" becomes a "dead dogma. 78 Even worse, the systemic effects
of suppressing false opinions go further because having lost these individual oppor-
tunities for analysis and ratiocination, one loses the opportunity to practice the skills
of analysis necessary to maintain and nurture a critical mind.79 Thus, according to Mill,
falsity in discourse is to be valued for its own sake.8°
Third, Mill argues that the vast majority of speech does not fall into the first two
categories; rather, most of our utterances combine some amount of truth with some
amount of falsity.8 ' In such cases, he argues, we need to hear both conflicting views
in order to extract the whole and complete truth about a question. According to
Mill, on all subjects not directly available to the senses, the majority of human
expression is only partially true, and this applies to both the favored and disfavored
views on such subjects.83 Only by analyzing the competing propositions and accepting
the truth from both while discarding the falsity can we arrive at more complete and
synthetic understandings of the world around us.84
Thus, Mill offered an important exposition of the values inherent in false speech
and the dangers of suppressing speech based upon its presumed falsity. At the same
time, however, Mill's analysis has three important shortcomings: it does not address
74 Id. at 21, 28-29.
71 Id. at 20; see also Solum, supra note 69, at 877 (summarizing this argument and
describing it as "one of the most elegant in all of political philosophy").
76 See MILL, supra note 1, at 37-42.
77 Id. at 38 (stating that people who do not know the basis for their beliefs have no ground
for such beliefs and should rationally choose to suspend their judgment).
78 Id. at 37.
79 See id. at 45-47.
80 See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279 n. 19 (1964) (using Mill's
argument on this point to support its holding that the Constitution protected some types of
false speech).
81 MILL, supra note 1, at 47.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 47-52.
'4 See id. at 47, 53.
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the effect of insincerity on the utility of free expression, it is too demanding in its
requirements for belief-formation, and it only addresses easy cases as examples.
First, and most importantly, Mill omits discussion of one of the hardest
questions facing free expression theory in its application to false speech: in what
sense does fault, i.e., knowledge or carelessness with regards to the falsity of a message,
deprive false speech of the benefits Mill describes? Although Mill seems to acknowl-
edge that fraudulent speech, for example, can be suppressed, 5 he never explains why
a speaker's insincerity should or should not alter the cost-benefit calculus.
Second, Mill assumes that people are capable of far more ratiocination than is
plausible; although he criticizes the holding of any belief when a speaker cannot
explain the reasons for it,86 our society depends upon individuals believing a great
many things on authority. It is asking a great deal to assert that a person who cannot
demonstrate the derivation of the general theory of relativity and defend it against
all challengers therefore has no basis for believing it to be true, or to say that a
person who cannot resolve an argument between meteorologists is unjustified in
believing that a weather report is likely to be accurate. Mill's argument, in short,
cannot deal with the necessity in a society such as ours for many people to be
rationally ignorant on a great many topics.
Third, Mill uses only examples of the suppression of highly contestable proposi-
tions to support his arguments about the dangers of assuming infallibility and the
benefits of hearing false speech. 7 Thus, Mill relies greatly on examples of religious
or political "truths" that surely have many champions on both sides, but he does not
assess the utility of denying simple facts about which agreement is nearly universal,
such as that the sun rises in the East and sets in the West.8 There may be good
reasons for allowing people to assert that the sun does not behave in this way, but
fear that we would be unable to assert confidently that the sun rises in the East
unless we had argued the point with an unconvinced party is not one of those
reasons.8 9 More generally, Mill spends no time discussing why we should protect
false assertions about facts available to sensory experience, the types of cases in
which "moral certainty," if not infallible certainty, is available on the evidence. 9°
Without an explanation of why it harms us to suppress speech regarding matters
easily provable, Mill's theory seems guilty of overreaching and at most can establish
that we should sometimes protect false speech, not that we should always do so.
85 See id. at 95 (suggesting that principles of free trade should admit of exceptions to
prevent, inter alia, frauds by adulteration of products).
86 Id. at 38.
87 STEPHEN, supra note 7, at 74-77.
88 MIL, supra note 1, at 26-31, 41-44, 48-52; STEPHEN, supra note 7, at 76.
89 See STEPHEN, supra note 7, at 76.
90 Id. at 78.
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Thus, Mill constructed a powerful argument that false speech was generally
deserving of protection from suppression because suppressing it tends to undermine
the state of our knowledge. Unfortunately, Mill only analyzed false speech regarding
ideas about religion or politics, not the more mundane types of factual falsity with
which the law mostly concerns itself. Nor does he offer an account of when a
speaker's insincerity ought to deprive false speech of protection. Thus, although Mill's
work can offer a starting point for developing a theory of the First Amendment's
application to falsity, it is unable to guide us in working out the details.
2. False Speech and Informational Goals: The Risk of Suppressing Truthful Speech
Mill's first argument for protecting false speech was based upon the risk of
suppressing true speech in the attempt to ban what we believe to be false.9' This
concern has been greeted with acceptance in modem scholarship. Modem scholars
have identified two important ways that suppressing false speech will tend to suppress
true speech as well. First, even courts sometimes err, and thus suppression on the
basis of falsity will inevitably sweep some true speech into the net as well. Second,
suppressing false speech can have ramifications outside of individual cases, by chilling
the speech of those who fear that they might not be able to prove that what they
believe is true in a court of law or those who are simply reluctant to undergo the time
and expense of litigation. Unfortunately, this scholarship suffers from an important
gap: without estimating how much harm is caused by protecting false speech in order
to avoid incidentally suppressing some truthful speech, it will never be possible to
claim convincingly that these risks justify protecting false but sincere speech.
The first way that suppressing false speech might harm our societal access to
knowledge is by erroneously suppressing some truthful speech. This point, which
was made forcefully by Mill,92 was also raised by Zechariah Chafee, who wrote that
truth can only be found through free discussion, because "once force is thrown into
the argument, it becomes a matter of chance whether it is thrown on the false side
or the true. 93 This point has recently been expanded upon by Cass Sunstein, who
noted that a key danger in permitting government suppression is that the government
may err when it chooses to suppress allegedly false speech.94 Professor Sunstein
argued at some length that this danger is intolerable, given the strong social pres-
sures toward conformity of belief and the corresponding social need to cultivate
dissent in order to prevent "information cascades" that cause initial errors to be widely
magnified through repetition.9
91 MILL, supra note 1, at 20-21.
92 Id. at 22-25.
93 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNrrED STATES 31 (1954).
94 SUNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 97; accord SCHAUER, supra note 70, at 170 (noting that
courts "are frequently wrong").
" SUNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 54-73.
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The second way that suppressing false speech may suppress truthful speech is
the possibility of "chilling effects," a concern that has animated the Supreme Court's
willingness to protect some false but sincere speech in defamation cases.96 As Kent
Greenawalt has noted, we may often believe that what we would like to say is true
but still feel uncertain about our ability to prove that truth to a court if pressed. 97
When such concerns are combined with the ever-increasing costs of litigation,
liability for false speech may well deter non-litigants from uttering true statements.
Nor is this concern merely hypothetical; modest empirical evidence of such an effect
has already been gathered, with news organizations in Britain reporting that the
possibility of being liable for making false statements has deterred them from
reporting on some facts they believed to be true.98
The problem with this line of argument, however, has been noted by Frederick
Schauer: to protect these evanescent traces of truth from being erroneously
suppressed or chilled, we must also tolerate "a great deal of falsity."99 If the
expression of false facts is generally harmful to our knowledge as a society,"° then
the relevant question becomes a complicated empirical inquiry: does the harm we
avoid by protecting false statements in order to avoid erroneous suppression and
chilling effects exceed the increased harm caused by the false statements we might
otherwise suppress? Even worse, the problem is not nearly so all or nothing as the
above statements might suggest; the litigation system has numerous procedural
devices that can be used to lessen the risk of erroneous verdicts and chilling
effects.' 1 Without a careful study of the extent of chilling effects and the harm
caused by permitting false speech to flourish (which has never yet been performed),
the argument from error and chilling effects simply cannot produce robust answers
to the First Amendment problems of false and insincere speech. Thus, although the
concerns raised by scholars such as Chafee, Greenawalt, and Sunstein are certainly
apt, they do not answer key questions.
3. Political Theory and the Value of False Speech
The existing scholarship on the risk of suppressing true speech along with false
speech fails to provide a complete approach due to its failure to weigh the gains of
protecting false speech in order to avoid chilling effects against the potential harm
96 See discussion supra Part I.A.l.
97 KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 136 (1989).
98 Russell L. Weaver & Geoffrey Bennett, Is the New York Times "Actual Malice"
Standard Really Necessary? A Comparative Perspective, 53 LA. L. REv. 1153, 1172 (1993)
(surveying British media organizations and reporting that of the newsrooms surveyed, "all
stated that they were not able to publish everything that they believed was true" as a result
of potential defamation liability).
9 SCHAUER, supra note 70, at 28.
100 Id. at 28, 32-33 (suggesting that false speech is generally likely to harm listeners).
'0' See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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that would be caused by the false speech we would protect. A workable theory will
have to take into account the costs and benefits of the false speech itself in addition
to its effects on truthful speech. One method would be to follow Mill's lead and
argue that false speech is valuable for its ability to help refine and test our
knowledge, but this argument has been roundly rejected in modem scholarship. In
its place, scholars have suggested, although rarely elaborated, a number of
alternative reasons why we might wish to protect false but sincere speech. These
theories usually sidestep the difficult epistemological question of how much harm
is caused by false speech by relying instead on premises from political theory or
deontological ethics. Such theories provide useful insights and usually suggest that
false speech that is sincerely believed by its utterer should receive some amount of
constitutional protection. Unfortunately, because of the reluctance of these theorists
to engage with the question of how harmful false or insincere speech may be, we
cannot know how to balance the values they develop against such harms. Thus,
unless one adopts certain specific, absolutist premises of free expression theory, one
is unlikely to be persuaded by these rationales.
Modem First Amendment scholarship displays a broad trend towards rejecting
Mill's arguments for the value of false speech, at least as a categorical matter."°2
Sometimes this rejection is cursory and unreflective; thus, in his otherwise careful
exposition of issues of falsity and insincerity in free expression, Kent Greenawalt
rejects Mill's thesis without argument, stating merely that the value of false speech
is "highly limited."' 1 3 Other scholars, however, have plowed this ground more
thoroughly. Frederick Schauer argues that Mill's analysis works better when
treating questions of broad normative principle than mundane facts and concludes
that false speech about factual or scientific propositions is of little value because
such information tends to be verifiable in a way that normative statements are not. °4
Because Schauer is skeptical about the ability of the public to sort out truth from
falsity when competing ideas are freely discussed,'0 5 he thinks that there is a large
risk that false statements will be believed and acted upon by the public at large.l16
102 One of the few counterexamples is an extremely brief discussion by Thomas Emerson,
which largely retreads Mill's argument, although without referring directly to it. See
EMERSON, supra note 13, at 6-7.
103 GREENAWALT, supra note 97, at 48 (raising Mill's argument but then asserting, without
explanation, that the audience interest in hearing false messages is "highly limited").
104 SCHAUER, supra note 70, at 30-33.
'o Id. at 25-26. Schauer compares members of the public unfavorably with members of
the scientific or academic communities, who he believes are more capable in this regard. Id.
As he writes:
It is one thing to say that truth is likely to prevail in a select group of
individuals trained to think rationally and chosen for that ability. It is quite
another to say that the same process works for the public at large.... We
must take the public as it is.
Id. at 26.
"o Id. Steven Smith uses a different approach to attack Mill's argument based on the claim
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Thus, in Schauer's account, the harm of allowing false statements of fact to be utter-
ed is in fact quite significant.'17
Another group of scholars, however, addresses falsity without reference to these
epistemological questions, instead supporting the protection of false statements for
reasons that do not relate to their effect upon our knowledge. Thus, several theorists
that it is internally inconsistent. Steven D. Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in the
Theory of Free Expression, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 668-69 (1987). Smith attacks Mill's
notion that, under conditions of free competition between true and false beliefs, knowledge
will be increased, on the basis that this argument depends on a contradiction. Id. According
to Smith, "one must believe [that] ... truth is unattainable" to believe that government will
be incapable of sorting out true beliefs from false as part of a regulatory scheme. Id. at 668.
But at the same time, one must be very optimistic about the ability of people to ascertain truth
when comparing competing ideas, in order to believe that the collision of truth and falsity will
tend to produce truth. Id. Smith believes that this tension between skepticism and epistemic
confidence explodes the truth-seeking rationale for protecting falsity. Id. at 668-69.
Smith's argument is premised on the idea that we cannot know things unless we know
them with certainty. The problem is that this is a false assumption: we very commonly
believe things without certainty, yet feel confident enough to act upon them. Certainty is a
stringent standard of belief that should only apply when we can conceive of no way that we
could be wrong, given our evidence. It is the statement of infallibility, that we cannot
possibly be wrong on a question. Thus, after walking in from the rain, I might say "it is
raining outside," and believe it to be the case. At the same time, I would not be certain,
because I know that it may have stopped raining since I walked in, and thus it is possible,
though unlikely, that I am wrong.
We constantly make decisions on the basis of beliefs that are less strong than a certainty.
A prime example is the reasonable doubt standard: before depriving citizens of their liberty
or lives, we require not certain proof, but only proof to a high degree of probability. Indeed,
the legal system will deprive people of property in civil suits on the basis of proof that is far
less than a certainty. Thus, the error in Smith's argument is this: it is perfectly possible to
believe, or even believe strongly, that some beliefs held in the past are false, while not
holding all of our present beliefs to a certainty. For further discussion on this point, see
GREENAWALT, supra note 97, at 18 (noting that we can be very confident of theories
acknowledged as provisional); MILL, supra note 1, at 22 ("There is the greatest difference
between presuming an opinion to be true, because, with every opportunity for contesting it,
it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its
refutation."); SCHAUER, supra note 70, at 18 (noting that we can consider increasing our
confidence intervals with regard to truth claims as progress towards knowledge, even if we
do not reach one hundred percent certainty).
107 Somewhat surprisingly, Schauer does not endorse a more limited role for state
regulation of defamation as a result of this conclusion; rather, he rests his support for the
current state of the law on a "stipulated priority" for speech interests over reputational and
epistemological harms, combined with a concern for error and chilling effects in the
regulation of false speech. SCHAUER, supra note 70, at 170-71. Of course, the point made
supra still holds in this regard; Schauer is necessarily making an empirical
presupposition-that the amount of true speech erroneously suppressed or chilled is
sufficiently great, once the stipulated priority is placed on the scale, to outweigh the manifest
harms he believes flow from false factual utterances made to members of the public.
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have asserted-sometimes implicitly-that false but sincere speech deserves pro-
tection for reasons that flow from moral or political theory. The structure and
consequences of such theories are rarely developed in detail, but the result is often
the same: we should protect false speech that is sincerely believed to be true by its
utterer but we should not protect knowing lies.
Perhaps the most commonly articulated version of this claim comes from
theorists who believe that the free expression guarantee is designed to facilitate our
ability to act as autonomous agents in making choices and in expressing ourselves.
Multiple authors have posited that we should treat deliberate lies differently from
innocent mistakes, because only lies violate the autonomy of listeners by treating
them as means rather than ends, in the Kantian sense. 08 Thus, according to David
Strauss, deliberate lies are problematic because they involve a "denial of autonomy"
by "interfer[ing] with a person's control over her own reasoning processes."' By
contrast, sincerely-made false statements do not involve the same degree of manip-
ulation, so they should be protected."0 A similar view has been forwarded by
Professor Greenawalt. In Greenawalt's view, although lies can and should be
punished in many cases, innocent falsehoods should generally be protected"'
because of the "affront to [a speaker's] dignity" and autonomy that occurs when we
punish a speaker for saying what she believes to be true." 2
Although Alexander Meiklejohn took strong issue with a focus on autonomy as
an explanation for the meaning of free expression, his own theory, which empha-
sized the role of citizen-rulers in a democratic state, seemed to lead to a similar
conclusion. Meiklejohn argued for an interpretation of the First Amendment that
allowed for no balancing of First Amendment values against harm, while arguing
that only speech on topics of concern to citizens as voters was entitled to pro-
tection." 3 However, within the sphere of discussion on matters of public concern,
Meiklejohn believed the First Amendment protected all ideas, regardless of their
truth and falsity, and specifically encouraged the sort of dialogic presentation of
competing ideas that was so central to Mill's thesis." 4 In Meiklejohn's interpretation,
108 See C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REv. 891,
910 (2002); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA
L. REV. 964, 1002 & n. 112 (1978); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom
of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 334, 354-55 (1991); Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and
the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA
L. REv. 1107, 1113-15 (2006).
"0 Strauss, supra note 108, at 354.
" Id. at 355.
"' GREENAWALT, supra note 97, at 48, 132.
112 Id. at 48.
"3 ALEXANDER MEIKEJ OHN, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government, reprinted
in POLITIcAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OFTHE PEOPLE 3,26-27,64-65 (1948).
".. Id. at 27.
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the First Amendment leaves it to citizen-rulers to determine what wise policy is, and
therefore we cannot ever suppress speech because we disagree with the ideas being
expressed."' It is not clear whether Meiklejohn's argument was meant to extend to
false statements of verifiable facts as well as ideas; although citizen-rulers
presumably have an interest in determining for themselves the factual predicates that
underlie their voting decisions, Meiklejohn never explored whether his theory
required dialogic presentation of factual information as well as normative ideas." 6
What is clear, however, is that Meiklejohn clearly distinguished the type of false
speech he was willing to protect from conscious lies; lies do not involve "discussing
the public interest," but rather merely pretend to do so, and thus they cannot ever be
the type of democratic deliberation that Meiklejohn believes should be protected.' 17
These insights regarding false speech are important. To a large degree, most of
us would probably feel that the government was reaching too far if it punished us
for innocent errors. Although the feelings involved may often be hard to articulate,
there is surely something to the idea that such restrictions would be an invasion of
a type of autonomy we cherish and that we would feel a loss of the dignity and equal
respect owed to us as citizens.
Nevertheless, the analysis is still woefully incomplete on this score. First,
although Meiklejohn and some autonomy theorists reject any notion of balancing
First Amendment benefits against harm, a wide array of First Amendment theories
hold that such balancing is absolutely necessary before we can know for sure
whether a type of speech ought to be protected. 1' 8 But because the political theory
values discussed above skip the step of assessing the harms and benefits caused by
false speech itself, we are unable to assess when such balancing may be necessary
and to what degree. Likewise, the political theory values are typically painted with
a broad brush, discussing only the extremes of innocent error and deliberate lies."19
115 Id.
116 Meiklejohn did, however, respond very favorably to the Court's decision in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), that some false statements of fact deserved
constitutional protection; he famously referred to that decision as an occasion for "dancing
in the streets." See Harry Kalven Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUP. CT. REv. 191, 221 n.125.
117 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 113, at 41-42; see Alexander Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 259. But see John M. Kang, The Case
for Insincerity, 29 STUD. L., POL. & SOC. 143(2003) (arguing that insincerity serves useful
functions in democratic discourse by preventing friction between antagonistic social groups).
"' See, e.g., CHAFEE, supra note 93, at 35; see also MILL, supra note 1, at 56 (including
an exception for speech that causes immediate and grave harms within his theory of free
expression); GREENAWALT, supra note 97, at 292-93; SCHAUER, supra note 70, at 131-32;
Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591,622-25 (1982).
119 But see GREENAWALT, supra note 97, at 48, 316 (noting some grey areas between
innocence and outright insincerity and providing a very brief sketch of how they might be
addressed).
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The problem is that there are a number of shades of grey between earnestly
believing that what you say is true and being certain that it is false. Likewise, there
are many statements that are neither simply true nor simply false, but combine truth
and falsity or convey shades of implied meaning that can be misleading. Political
theorists have spent little time exploring the details of the relationship between state
of mind and the content of assertions, and the consequences of that relationship for
constitutional protection. The present Article will be devoted to filling in this gap
by showing how a detailed account of the epistemological harms and benefits of
false and insincere speech buttresses these conclusions in political theory, removing
any concern that the harms posited by Professor Schauer will require us to balance
away the political theory values that urge protection for false but sincere speech.
First, however, I will lay the groundwork for this argument by briefly introducing a
few philosophical concepts that will assume center stage in the subsequent analysis.
II. FOUNDATIONS FOR A THEORY OF FALSE AND INSINCERE EXPRESSION
Before proceeding to the core of this project, it will be helpful to provide some
background in important philosophical concepts that will aid an analysis of the
harms and benefits that flow from false, insincere, or misleading speech. This
Section will attempt to lay that foundation. First, I will try to define the concepts
of falsity and insincerity with more precision, so that we can be clear what we mean
when we analyze statements as "false" or "insincere."
Second, I will work to provide more clarity regarding what is meant by labeling
a statement as misleading. To this effect, I will introduce Paul Grice's work in
implicative meanings. The theory of implicatures will enable us to understand how
we go about generating implied meanings and the ways that these meanings can be
used to convey false or insincere messages via literally true communications.
Furthermore, Grice' s theory will help us to understand that each propositional state-
ment we make is understood both as a description of the world and also as a
description of our own mental states, so that every insincere statement is also
factually misleading. Later on, the development of a careful understanding of the
nature of implied meanings will be important as we try to understand the difference
between implied meanings, on the one hand, and the larger class of inferences that
can be drawn from all speech, on the other.
Finally, I will introduce some of the important work of Alvin Goldman in social
veritistic epistemology, which will help us assess the harms and benefits of false,
insincere, and misleading statements through an understanding of when argumenta-
tion between proponents of competing beliefs will be likely to lead to an increase
in our social knowledge. When combined with the understandings developed above
regarding the nature of false, insincere, and misleading speech, Goldman's work will
help us see that, in most of the situations to which the First Amendment applies,
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false but sincerely-believed speech will generally cause more benefits than harm,
because it will provoke an argumentative discourse that will yield more increase in
our knowledge than would have occurred if the false statement had never been
uttered. Goldman's work will also help us understand why these benefits do not
extend to statements that are insincere.
A. Falsity and Insincerity Defined
To begin, it will be useful to specify with more clarity what is meant by the
concepts of truth, falsity, sincerity, and insincerity. For the purposes of this analy-
sis, I will define truth broadly as a relation of correspondence between a statement
and the world. A statement is "true," according to this definition, when it
corresponds with facts, and it is false when it fails to do so. This is known as the
correspondence theory of truth, and it represents the dominant strand of epistemic
thought on the subject.' 20
Obviously specifying exactly what the "correspondence" relation involves can
be a tricky proposition; sentences and events in the world do not admit of any
obvious isomorphism.' 2' But a simple way to approach the question of correspon-
dence is to note that those sentences we view as propositional-those sentences that
can be either true or false-are those that seem to be trying to describe reality. In
other words, such sentences make reference to an event or object that exists in the
world and then attempt to classify or describe it.
22
A simple theory of truth-as-correspondence posits that when a sentence both
purports to describe something about the world, and succeeds in doing so, it is called
a true statement. 23 When a sentence purports to describe reality but fails to do so,
120 See GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 42 (describing correspondence theory as being "the
most natural and popular account of truth-acknowledged to be such even by its critics"); id.
at 59-68 (setting forth one version of the correspondence theory). For other accounts of the
correspondence theory, see J.L. AUSTIN, Truth, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 85, 89 (1961);
BERTRAND RUSSELL, Truth and Falsehood, in THE PROBLEMS OFPHILOSOPHY 128-29 (1997).
121 See, e.g., GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 61-63 (describing some of the difficulties
implicit in simplistic accounts of the correspondence relation).
122 See AUSTIN, supra note 120, at 89-90. I shall use the language of statements
throughout this Section, although the view I establish works equally well as an analysis of
what it means for belief to be true. Similarly, I shall assume, for the purposes of this
discussion, that statements are successful, in that they actually communicate what a speaker
intends to convey. In other words, the term "sincerity" is employed in this Article to describe
a feature of utterances, rather than to describe a speaker's intent to speak truthfully or falsely.
Cf. Micah Schwartzman, The Principle of Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REv. (forthcoming
2008) (defining sincerity as a correspondence between what a speaker believes and what a
speaker intends to convey).
123 See GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 59--60.
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it is called a false statement. 124 When a sentence does not purport to describe reality
at all, we call it non-assertive, and say that it lacks truth-value entirely.
125
The concept of sincerity is closely related to the concept of truth; however,
rather than depending upon a correspondence between statements and external
reality, sincerity concerns the correspondence between what a speaker believes and
what he says. In other words, a statement is sincerely made when it accurately rep-
resents a speaker's belief state concerning the subject matter of the statement. 126 By
contrast, when a statement does not accurately represent the speaker's belief state
with regard to what is being spoken of, it is an insincere statement.
Although we often speak as if belief were a binary state, the reality is more
complicated. At a minimum, there are three meaningful belief states I can have with
respect to what I say: belief (where I think that my statement is true), disbelief
(where I think my statement is false), and suspension of belief (where I do not know
whether my statement is true or false, usually because I lack evidence). 127 And
having gone this far, we can easily go further and realize that there is in fact a
continuum of belief states, representing incremental increases or decreases in our
confidence regarding certain facts about the world.
However, our linguistic capacity is limited, and we usually do not say things
like "I believe it is raining outside to a degree of probability of .785." Nevertheless,
the concept of sincerity still has value. We can get a fair idea of how strongly
someone believes something through ordinary linguistic choices-like the difference
between "I'm not sure," "I think so," and "I'm positive." We can also describe as
insincere those statements that assert or imply a degree of belief regarding a state-
ment that the speaker does not actually hold.
Thus, to say that speech is false is to say that it does not accurately describe the
world; to say that it is insincere is to say that it does not correspond with a speaker's
belief state. Any statement may be either true or false, sincere or insincere in any
combination, 128 as follows:
True False
Sincere Truly-Believed Statements Honest Errors
Insincere Accidentally Correct Lies Deliberate Falsehoods
124 See id. at 60.
125 See id.
126 Cf. GREENAWALT, supra note 97, at 131 (describing insincerity as saying what one
does not believe, irrespective of its truth or falsity).
127 See GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 88.
128 See GREENAWALT, supra note 97, at 131; see also Frederick Schauer & Richard
Zeckhauser, Paltering 5-6 (Kennedy School of Gov't, Working Paper No. RWP07-006
2007), available at http://ssm.con/abstract=832634 (discussing the category of unintentional
misstatements).
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B. Understanding Misleading Speech: Implicative Meanings
The sketch above of true statements as those that are descriptively successful
begs an important question: how do we know what it is that a given statement is
describing? Although this might seem a silly question (after all, we can all
understand each other when we converse), it is in fact a very important one. People
use language in many ways other than the strictly literal, making use of devices such
as tone, metaphor, and implication to convey information not necessarily present in
the literal meaning of a sentence's words and grammatical structure. A theory of
false speech that could not process usages other than the literal would be hobbled
and unable to interact with actual linguistic practices. Thus, this Section will briefly
sketch out an account of the meaning of our statements, with special attention
devoted to the complicated phenomenon of implicature.
Misleading speech is speech that is not literally false or deceptive but is used to
convey things that are either untrue or which the speaker does not believe. People
can deceive each other using far more subtle techniques than the outright lie, and
this type of deception can include the conveyance of messages through other means
than the literal meaning of speech. 129
We encounter this sort of deception all the time. For instance, it can be seen in
the selective suppression of unfavorable facts so as to give a false impression.
Suppose that the CEO of an automotive company is asked if he believes the 2007
Herculon is dangerous. He replies by saying, "How dare you suggest such a thing?
Consumer Reports gave the Herculon a perfect safety rating." Even if literally true,
such a statement could be deceptive and misleading if the CEO knew that Consumer
Reports had been reviewing the 2006 Herculon and that the 2007 model had
performed significantly worse than the 2006 in safety testing. 3
Another example would be the use of selectively unimpressive information
regarding a candidate for a job recommendation. If a teacher wished to send a false
message that a student was a poor candidate for a particular job, he could do so
without uttering any false statements. Instead, he could simply focus his praise on
the candidate's diligence, punctuality, and penmanship, using the selective omissions
29 See WILLIAM G. LYCAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE: A CONTEMPORARY
INTRODUCTION 189-90 (2000); cf. LUDWIG WrrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICALINVESTIGAIONS
§ 23 (3d ed. 1958) ("There are... countless different kinds of use of what we call 'symbols,'
'words,' [and] 'sentences.' And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all;
but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and
others become obsolete and get forgotten.").
130 See H.P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 165,
170-71 (A.P. Martinich ed., 4th ed. 2001) (suggesting that if someone is asked where a
filling station is and responds with the location of a garage, without disclosing that it is
closed or out of gasoline, such a response would surreptitiously violate a conversational
maxim and thus be misleading).
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of relevant information to send a message that the student was in fact
underwhelming. 3 ' Because the teacher could use such tactics regardless of whether
the student in question was actually underwhelming, the tactic could generate either
a truthful implication or a misleading one.
An important tool in our attempt to analyze the harm of these misleading
statements will be Paul Grice' s theory of implicatures. An implicature is a message
conveyed by other than the literal meaning of language; Grice attempted to describe
the way in which we signal that we are using language in non-literal ways and
understand when others have done so.13 2 Grice began his project by noting that there
were some implicatures that were easy to understand. What Grice calls "conven-
tional implicatures" share a common feature, in that they all involve the use of
predefined language conventions to generate their implicative force. 133 Thus, when
we say, "Bob is a lawyer, but he's a nice guy, really," the word "but" creates the
implication that this case is atypical, and lawyers in general are not nice." A
number of other words have this subtle but apparent ability to imply meanings
beyond those literally conveyed in the sentence.35
Grice's more important contribution was his development of the concept of
conversational implicatures. Conversational implicatures convey meanings outside
the literal, but they differ from conventional implicatures because they do not rely
on the use of words or grammatical forms with the preexisting conventional power
to convey implicative meaning.'36 Rather, conversational implicatures arise solely
from a combination of the context in which a statement is made and its form. For
instance, when I respond to a query about Bob's lawyering skills by asserting that
he is good at ping-pong, there are no conventional devices that I use to imply that
Bob's lawyering is subpar; rather, the implication flows from the context (the
question I was asked) and my choice of response-to talk about ping-pong, not trial
advocacy skills.
According to Grice, the method by which we communicate such messages relies
on the social conventions that underlie conversational exchanges.137 Grice attempted
to catalogue these rules and use them to explain the concept of implicatures. In his
131 Id. at 171; see also LYCAN, supra note 129, at 189-90 (providing the example of one
philosopher being asked whether Smedley was a good philosopher and replying instead that
Smedley was good at ping-pong).
132 See Grice, supra note 130, at 165-75.
133 Id. at 166-67.
134 Id.
' For instance, "although" can impose a contrasting implication; "too" or "either" can
imply similarity; "therefore" or "thus" can imply causation. See LYCAN, supra note 129, at 188.
Similarly, we use certain standardized sentence structure to carry conventional implications, as
when we ask, '"an you do something?" when we mean, "Please do something."
136 Grice, supra note 130, at 167.
137 Id.
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account, we generally and unconsciously observe-and expect others to observe-
the following restrictions on conversation:
(1) The Maxim of Quantity: this maxim is violated when we provide either
significantly more or significantly less information than is appropriate
at a given stage of a conversational exchange.
(2) The Maxim of Quality: this maxim is violated when we fail to make an
effort to say only that which is true, either by uttering that which we
believe to be false or by uttering that for which we lack evidence.
(3) The Maxim of Relation: this maxim is violated when our contributions
to discussion are irrelevant.
(4) The Maxim of Manner: this maxim is violated when we fail to speak
perspicuously; it teaches us to avoid obscurity and ambiguity and be as
brief and orderly in our speech as is reasonably possible.
38
As Grice describes it, we generally expect that our conversations will obey these
maxims to a significant degree-and hence, we treat it as an implied feature of all
communications that others are in fact doing SO. 139 However, we can also use the
maxims in a more striking way; by gratuitously and obviously violating them, we
can signal to others that we are seeking to communicate something beyond the
literal, what Grice calls a "conversational implicature."' 0 An example may help
here. When I ask about Bob's lawyering skills and am told instead about his ping-
pong skills, I realize quickly that something is fishy about that response. I would
normally expect a more relevant answer (this is the operation of the Maxim of
Relation). Since I have no reason to think that my interlocutor is trying to mislead
me or breach the normal rules of conversation, I have to search for another meaning
than the literal one concerning ping-pong. One quickly springs to mind: she does
not think much of Bob's legal acuity but is hesitant to say so directly. The meaning
is thus communicated through the violation of the Maxim of Relation, combined
with some fairly typical assumptions concerning her likely mental state.'
41
Neither type of implied message necessarily will be misleading; after all, we
constantly send truthful and sincere implicatures through these channels. However,
these two methods are a key way that we can choose to transmit misleading
messages. Thus, we can speak as if nothing is unusual without disclosing that we
are violating the standard rules of conversational exchanges, or we can flout those
138 Id. at 167-68.
1' Id. at 169.
140 Id. at 171-74.
"4' For the basis of the ping-pong example, see LYCAN, supra note 129, at 189. For an
explication of more examples of how conversational implicatures are generated through the
violation of conversational maxims, see Grice, supra note 130, at 171-74.
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rules in an apparent way, signaling to a listener that we mean something other than
what we are literally saying and thereby communicating a message that may be false
or insincere. Thus, if asked to give a candid assessment of Bob's legal ability,
assuming I held his abilities in high regard, I might mislead either by focusing on
a few, totally unrepresentative examples in which he performed poorly, thus quietly
violating the maxim of relation, or by adverting to his ping-pong skills as discussed
above. Both situations will communicate the misleading message that Bob is a bad
lawyer, without ever saying so directly, and both would be misleading even though
both might be literally true.
42
Finally, it is important to note that all insincere statements are examples of such
misleading speech. Given Grice's inclusion of belief based in reasons as one of the
assumptions underlying conversational exchanges, 143 his theory shows that most of our
statements include both an explicit assertion about the world and an implied assertion
about our own belief in that statement.'" In other words, when we speak assertively,
we are impliedly assuring a listener that we believe what we say; thus, each statement
we make contains both descriptions of the external world and of our beliefs.
Having unpacked the concept of implicature and having identified its basis in
the everyday norms of conversation, we can see that it will often be fairly easy to
substitute an implicature for an overt statement. It should also be clear that we can
use implicature to convey meanings which are false, or which we do not in fact
believe. Thus, implicatures can be either misleading because they are factually false
or misleading because they communicate an insincere assertion. Implicatures are
a central part of human communication and can convey important information, such
as when we signal directly what might be indelicate to say explicitly. Nevertheless,
implicatures may be capable of great harm when used to mislead others. Thus, an
analysis of the value of false speech will have to include an analysis of each of these
types of implicatures.
C. The Search for Knowledge as a Social Project
In addition to their relevance in helping us categorize statements for analysis,
the concepts of truth and belief have a second use. They form important compo-
nents of knowledge. Knowledge is generally analyzed to include only true beliefs 145
(with the additional caveats that true beliefs must generally be held for appropriate
14' Grice, supra note 130, at 170.
143 Id. at 167-68.
' See Smith, supra note 106, at 712-13.
14' ROBERT AUDI, EPISTEMOLOGY: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF
KNOWLEDGE 214-16 (1998) (discussing true belief as an essential component of knowledge).
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reasons-in other words, must be justified-4 6 -and not be formed in an accidental
way 47 in order to properly constitute knowledge).
Increasing our knowledge has frequently been acknowledged as an important
free expression value.'48 Knowledge is both an individual and a social good.
149
Thus, we generally feel that, ceteris paribus, it is better to know more rather than
46 Id. (describing the importance of justification as an element of what constitutes
knowledge). See generally Matthias Steup, Epistemology § 2 (2005), in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OFPHILOSOPHY, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/
(discussing the concept of justification and its myriad treatments). Justification enters the
picture because certain sorts of true beliefs are enormously unsatisfying and do not seem to
constitute knowledge in the ordinary sense. Thus, suppose that, on the basis of no evidence,
I develop an irrational confidence that it is currently raining in Paris. Suppose that not only
do I deeply believe this, but it is in fact correct, despite the fact that I did not have any reason
to think so. Such a belief is true, but it is not justified. See AUDI, supra note 145, at 215.
Why do we valuejustification-in other words, why not be satisfied with just being right
and not worry about the basis for our beliefs? Justification, as an account of why we think
what we think, and when we ought not to do so, is a critical tool we can use to assess which
of our beliefs are likely to be true and which are likely to be in error. When a belief is not
sufficiently justified-when we lack reasons for a belief-that indicates that it is less likely
to be true. See Steup, supra, § 2.1 (describing non-deontological justification as a view that
"properly probabilifies" a belief); see also GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 29 (describing the
concept of justification as tied to "truth-conduciveness"). Of course, it is important to
remember that justification makes a belief likely to be true but does not preclude the
possibility that it is false or does not constitute knowledge. For instance, on the basis of a
normally reliable weather report, I might believe that it is raining outside, even if in fact it
is not. Such a belief would be justified (because it is based on evidence that I have every
reason to think is reliable) but false (because it is not actually raining). Likewise, justified
true beliefs can be subject to Gettier problems. See, e.g., AUDI, supra note 145, at 216 (giving
an example of a justified true belief that is Gettiered).
"' In the language of epistemology, justified true beliefs must not be Gettiered, or formed
in certain ways that break the link between the justification of a belief and its truth, if they
are to count as knowledge. AUDI, supra note 145, at 216 (showing that although justified true
belief is necessary, it cannot account for some cases where we would feel that despite the
presence of all three conditions, knowledge does not exist); see EARL CONEE & RICHARD
FELDMAN, Internalism Defended, in EVIDENTIALISM: ESSAYS IN EPISTEMOLOGY 53, 71
(2004) (providing an example of a de-Gettierizing condition used to prevent accidentally
acquired but reasonable true beliefs from constituting knowledge). See generally Edmund
L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 23 ANALYSIS 121-23 (1963) (providing the
famous critique of the tripartite theory of knowledge that led modem philosophers to
incorporate a de-Gettierizing condition into their theories).
141 See, e.g., CHAFEE, supra note 93, at 31-33; EMERSON, supra note 13, at 6-7; MILL,
supra note 1, at 22-25, 28-29; Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment
Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 553.
"' See, e.g., GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 3 ("Information seeking is a pervasive activity
of human life."); SCHAUER, supra note 70, at 17 ("[T]he advantages of truth are almost
universally accepted.").
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know less, and we also feel that we are harmed when external factors deprive us of
knowledge we desire to have. 50 In addition to the satisfaction it provides in itself,
knowledge helps us navigate the world and achieve our goals and thus has enormous
instrumental value.'
5
'
In addition to these benefits to individual self-realization and autonomy,
knowledge carries other distinctly social benefits. It allows us to govern ourselves
effectively in the democratic process'52 and helps us detect and prevent abuses of
government authority.5 3 Through the disciplines of science and the work of
inventors and engineers, it enables us to enormously improve our security and our
quality of life. Thus, we can appropriately say that legal rules that cause or permit
our knowledge to be impoverished cause significant social harm, while those that
help expand our aggregate store of knowledge, and each member of society's access
to it, cause great social benefit. 54
An important insight, developed by Alvin Goldman, is that the tools of
epistemology can be used to assess not just what sort of internal practices we should
follow in order to form accurate beliefs, but what sort of social processes contribute
to increases in our aggregate knowledge as members of social groups.'55 Goldman's
project of social veritistic epistemology is dedicated to assessing the performance
of various social institutions based on whether they tend to increase or decrease the
aggregate strength and number of true beliefs across relevant social groups.'56
15o See GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 3 (describing the strong and universal human impulse
towards knowledge as motivated in part by our innate curiosity).
... Id. (describing practical concerns driving our need to know); Redish, supra note 118,
at 622-25 (discussing the value of self-realization, its connection with the free expression
principle, and its dependence on our ability to increase and develop our knowledge); Thomas
Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 213, 216-18 (1972)
(discussing the relationship between free expression and the value of obtaining knowledge
about the world, and thereby increasing our freedom and flourishing as autonomous beings).
152 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 113, at 26-27 (discussing the importance of access to
information for the process of democratic self-rule).
113 Blasi, supra note 148, at 553.
114 But see Frederick Schauer, Reflections on the Value of Truth, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
699,709-13 (1991) (arguing that some increases in knowledge, such as those that cause distress
to the person about whom new facts are learned, are more harmful than beneficial). Schauer's
argument need not concern us very much, however. Even if we grant that in some limited cases
it is harmful to learn true things, such exceptions do not defeat the general principle that
increasing our knowledge is usually valuable; rather, they only suggest that there should be
some limited exceptions to our general impulse to protect truthful speech. Id. at 723-24
(arguing that the disclosure of facts that an individual would like to keep private necessarily
subordinates that individual's interest in privacy to the communities' interest in knowledge, and
suggesting that with respect to some matters, such as the disclosure of a private individual's
sexual orientation, we should be reluctant to engage in such subordination).
155 See GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 4.
156 See id. at 5.
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One important aspect of Golc.aan' s work involves epistemic specialization and
the reliance upon experts to facilitate social knowledge. It is very often rational to
base our beliefs on what a reliable authority tells us.' 57 Thus, if I know that a
particular meteorologist is generally reliable and will give me more accurate
information regarding tomorrow's weather than I could predict using my own
(inferior) knowledge of meteorology, the rational and epistemically appropriate
choice is to defer to his judgment, even if I cannot understand the reasons he gives
for his conclusion. Indeed, much of the knowledge we receive in our education,
especially concerning the sciences, is justified on similar grounds. Few of us could
elaborate the reasons for the energy-orbital model of the atom and of atomic bonds,
but that does not mean it is rational for us to reject it. Thus, the often-heard scorn
for belief or argument from authority is more effective as a debating tactic than as
a description of any epistemic reality.
A further point follows: it is often rational for people to make decisions based
solely on the weight of authority when other considerations give little guidance
towards a truth-determination.118 I would have little to no ability on my own to
assess whether a given substance is carcinogenic; rather, I would need to rely on the
degree to which genuine experts agreed in order to decide whether I should believe
that the substance is carcinogenic, withhold belief, or disbelieve it. Thus, accurate
information concerning what opinions experts hold, when combined with what we
know about their general reliability, is an important tool for everyday citizens to
evaluate the truth-value of complex propositions as accurately as is possible given
their position."5 9
A second critically important insight from Goldman's work is what Goldman
calls the Truth-in-Evidence Principle (TEP). Built on the work of Camap' 6 and
Hempel in the philosophy of science, the TEP is intended to apply to all aspects of
the human search for truth. 161 It runs as follows: "A larger body of evidence is
'5 See id. at 266-67.
158 See id. at 81-82 (discussing the utility of forming beliefs through the weighing of
expert opinion, and the preferred method, which involves creating weighted averages of
expert opinion on the basis of their expected probability of yielding correct answers); Alvin
I. Goldman, Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust, 63 PHIL. & PHENOM. RES. 85, 97-102
(2001) (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of arriving at an opinion through the simple
weighing of expert testimony and concluding that this can in fact be a valuable technique,
provided one has reason to believe that the experts in question are at least partially
independent of one another, one does not have reason to believe that the minority are more
reliable experts, and the division of experts does not give rise to the conclusion that the risk
of error is simply too great to make a call).
'9 See Goldman, supra note 158, at 97-102.
'60 See RUDOLFCARNAP, LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILITY 211-13 (2d ed. 1962)
(noting that we should always use the largest possible subset of available evidence when
making inductive inferences).
161 See GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 145.
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generally a better indicator of the truth-value of a hypothesis than a smaller,
contained body of evidence, as long as all the evidence propositions are true and
what they indicate is correctly interpreted."'
6 2
It is important to state clearly what this means and what it does not mean. It does
not mean that increasing the amount of evidence under consideration will always
increase the accuracy of our belief states; after all, it is perfectly possible that our
evidence is locally misleading. For instance, if we were interested in determining
whether or not it was raining outside, we might take the entry of a person with wet
clothes to be useful evidence on this point. If, however, it was not raining and the
person got doused by a lawn sprinkler, we would be led away from the truth by
locally misleading, albeit true, evidence. But what the TEP does mean is that it will
usually be the case that an increase in evidence will yield an increase in accuracy in
belief states, because the weight of the evidence should favor the true proposition and
a subset of that evidence should on average reflect its overall weight (with the caveat
that this only works when we are able to rationally assess the additional evidence).' 63
Goldman uses the Truth-in-Evidence Principle to argue for the superiority of a
specific type of truth-seeking practice: defeater argumentation." 4 Defeater argu-
mentation is the practice of assailing an opponent's argument by presenting new
reasons that make a previously valid argument no longer hold. 165 Goldman argues
that argument will tend to increase the knowledge of speakers and listeners, so long
as the speakers are arguing from true premises (which can be assured to a significant
degree by requiring them to assert only sincerely-believed premises) and so long as
the audience is capable of interpreting the relationship between premises and
conclusion appropriately.66 This might seem to provide a quite limited justification
for the use of argumentation as a veritistic practice were it not for several other
features of such argumentation.
First, critical arguments often involve disputes over the truth of premises, which
may then be followed by further argumentation over the subdomain of the disputed
premises.' 67 If argumentation is generally truth-conducive, it should be possible to
162 Id. Other epistemologists have suggested a similar idea, although often expressed in
different terms. See, e.g., Richard J. Hall & Charles R. Johnson, The Epistemic Duty to Seek
More Evidence, 35 AM. PHIL. Q. 129, 130-31 (1998) (stating that when we desire to believe
as many truths and disbelieve as many falsehoods as possible, we have a diachronic
epistemic duty to acquire as much evidence as possible concerning propositions about which
we are not certain).
163 Cf SCHAUER, supra note 70, at 26 (expressing skepticism regarding the rationality of
members of the American public). It should be noted that Goldman does not claim that the
TEP is subject to rigorous proof; rather, he describes it as "an attractive methodological
postulate." GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 146.
164 GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 146-47.
165 See id. at 138-41.
166 See id. at 146.
167 See id. at 140-42.
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winnow back to a set of true premises by the systematic dispute of any contestable
premises, as long as an audience is still engaged by the discussion.
Likewise, argument often contests the support relationship between premises
and conclusion. If we view the appropriate relationship between premises and
conclusion as a conclusion in its own right with a separate set of proper premises,
then it is possible that dialectic argumentation can increase the rationality of an
audience's assessment of an opposing theory. These facts, combined with the
frequent use of dialectic argumentation in veritistically focused settings such as
courtrooms, help to show that the presentation and development of opposed
arguments by believers of incompatible propositions may be a very useful way to
increase the aggregate social awareness of truth. This insight-that argument
between champions of opposing beliefs tends to increase our social store of
knowledge when Goldman's conditions are met-will form the backbone of this
Article's assessment of the harms and benefits caused by false and insincere speech.
This Section has introduced several key concepts. First, it has attempted to
define the concepts of falsity and insincerity with enough precision to enable
thorough analysis. Second, it has introduced some key concepts from the
philosophy of language regarding the nature of implied meanings, including both
the insight that most of our speech includes implied assurances of our belief states
regarding what we say and the insight that it is remarkably easy to substitute
implicatures for outright assertions in a wide variety of situations, so that we can
easily communicate either false or insincere messages without saying anything that
is literally untrue or insincere. Finally, it has related the important contributions of
Goldman's work on social veritistic epistemology, including the importance of
specialization, as well as the Truth-in-Evidence Principle and its use in a demonstra-
tion of the informational gains that are produced by the right kind of argumentation.
I1. FALSITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The previous Sections have provided a summary of existing false speech case
law and scholarship and presented some philosophical concepts that can be of use
for analyzing the problem of false speech. Now, I will defend the principle that the
First Amendment protects sincerely believed false speech as well as true speech.
The core of this argument will be a demonstration that, contrary to conventional
wisdom, the harm caused by sincerely believed false speech is generally outweighed
by its capacity to drive argumentation, which in turn furthers the collection,
dissemination, and preservation of evidence supporting true beliefs. Although
sincerely believed false speech will not always have this effect, it will do so often
enough that the harm it does cause should not generally disqualify it from
constitutional protection in the absence of severe and immediate harm flowing from
a local increase in false belief.
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A. The Truth-in-Evidence Principle and the Aggregation of Evidence
As discussed earlier, the Truth-in-Evidence Principle states judgments are likely
to be more accurate when they are based on a larger subset of the totality of relevant
evidence on a question. 68  The TEP generally supports the conclusion that
argumentation is likely to increase our store of true beliefs, providing that two
subsidiary requirements are satisfied: (1) the evidence propositions asserted during
argument are true (the True Premises Condition), and (2) we are able to correctly
interpret the asserted links between premises and conclusions (the Transparent
Inference Condition). 69
Argumentation generally promotes an increase in our evidence and thus
increases the likelihood that our beliefs are correct via the TEP. This is because
those who hold opposing views on a question, in the process of trying to defend
their beliefs, are likely to search out and disseminate supporting evidence on both
sides of a question. 7° Furthermore, those who hold opposing views are likely to
attack the evidentiary facts asserted by the other side; this will work to identify and
revise premises that are false, helping to assure that the True Premises Condition is
satisfied.' Finally, opponents are likely to assail weak connections between
premises and conclusions; this will help assure that the Transparent Inference
Condition is satisfied. 7 2 Thus, good faith argument by those who hold opposing
viewpoints is generally likely to increase the available evidence on the questions that
are disputed and, therefore, is likely to increase the accuracy of our beliefs with
respect to those questions.
We see evidence of this abstract principle in many domains in which we have
a strong and paramount interest in reaching true conclusions. For instance, the
adversary system of litigation clearly incorporates most of these features; it involves
an extended argument between advocates of opposing beliefs, in which each side
endeavors to locate and introduce facts favorable to their side, to show that the facts
asserted by their opponents are not true, and to locate flaws in the logical relation-
ship between the evidence asserted by one side and the ultimate questions at issue.
Likewise, the scientific and scholarly methods largely consist of an endeavor both
to assert positive arguments and to attack the arguments made by those with
opposing beliefs through the introduction of defeater evidence, assaults on
168 GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 145; see also discussion supra Part II.C.
169 See GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 145.
170 See id. at 145-49.
'' See id. at 140-42; see also Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982) ("In a political
campaign, a candidate's factual blunder is unlikely to escape the notice of, and correction by,
the erring candidate's political opponent.").
172 See discussion supra Part II.C.
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underlying assumptions, and attacks on an opponent's argumentative structure.
Thus, in domains in which arriving at true conclusions is viewed as a paramount
good, we regularly rely on argumentation to lead us to true conclusions.
It is important to note, however, what this argument does not show. Contrary
to Mill's original argument,'73 it does not show that argumentation will always lead
to more or deeper knowledge. Rather, the TEP suggests that more evidence is likely
to increase our knowledge. Thus the veritistically useful feature of argumentation,
its ability to increase our working total of evidence, will not always lead to more
accurate beliefs. Rather, argument will increase the accuracy of beliefs more often
than it will decrease accuracy. Specifically, argument will be of little utility when
it serves to create a locally misleading field of evidence.
The concept of a locally misleading subset of evidence should not be hard to
grasp. Examples of such situations, and their negative consequences for the
accuracy of our beliefs, abound both historically and in our daily experience. Thus,
the long-held belief that the Earth is still and the heavenly bodies rotate around it is
a reasonable resolution of the evidence available throughout most of human history;
knowing only that we did not feel the Earth moving and that we could observe the
heavenly bodies passing across the sky, the pre-Copernican models of heavenly
movement were reasonably produced by a locally misleading subset of evidence.
Likewise, we can encounter locally misleading evidence in our day-to-day lives
without anything sinister occurring. Imagine, for instance, that you are working in
a basement office without a radio or internet access, and you are trying to determine
what the weather outside is like. You observe several people walk by with um-
brellas or raincoats, and some of them seem to have damp hair. You ask a colleague
who ventured outside for lunch and learn that it was raining when he did so. On this
evidence, you reasonably conclude that it is raining outside. Nevertheless, the
subset of evidence may well be incomplete; it could have stopped raining since the
people you observed or interacted with had been outdoors. In such a case, true evi-
dentiary facts used in an appropriate way to generate a conclusion can nevertheless
generate an incorrect conclusion.
Note, however, that in both cases, further increasing the available subset of
evidence could have resolved the error by introducing astronomic results inconsistent
with a non-moving Earth or by helping our underground denizen learn that the
weather had changed recently. Such examples show the essential validity of the TEP:
increasing available evidence is likely in both cases to correct erroneous beliefs.
Now that we have refreshed ourselves with respect to the TEP and the epistemic
importance of acquiring more evidence on disputed questions, it is time to turn to
the central question: what are the effects of false but sincere speech, for better or for
worse, on the aggregate state of our knowledge?
173 See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
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B. Erroneous Speech as a Means of Increasing Our Evidence
When considering the potential harms and benefits of sincerely believed false
speech, it is important to analyze such speech in its social context. An analytic
approach that assumes that all or most false speech will cause false attitudes is
oversimplified;'74 we frequently hear incorrect information without instantly adopting
it as our own belief. The key question is this: what usually results from the
utterance of a sincerely believed false proposition? 175 In other words, this discussion
will analyze only cases in which the speaker believes what he is saying.
1. General Principles
There are essentially three important cases that must be considered: the false
proposition is believed by no one or by very few people (other than the speaker); the
false proposition is widely believed; or the false proposition is believed by some and
disbelieved by others, with large numbers on both sides of the question. Each will be
considered in turn to demonstrate that, as a general matter, protecting sincerely believed
false speech is less harmful to the state of our knowledge than suppressing it.
The first class of false utterances involves those assertions that are patently false
and are believed by very few people. Examples would include the earnest assertion
that the Earth is primarily made of butternut squash, that water turns to ice as its
temperature rises, or that Mickey Mouse is the current President of the United
States.'76 False assertions of such matters are unlikely to cause any harm to our
search for knowledge because almost no one would believe them. By contrast,
however, such utterances also convey an implied assertion of the speaker's belief;
we thereby learn that the speaker believes such unusual things. This causes a gain
in our knowledge; we learn that this particular speaker is not very credible (or
suffers from a mental illness or deficiency). We might even, on the basis of frequently
hearing ridiculous assertions, come to form beliefs about the proper course of future
education policy. But the main point is that hearing patently false assertions pro-
duces, on the whole, more veritistic gain than harm.
It could be objected here that some propositions that would be patently false to
an informed expert may not appear so to an unschooled listener. For instance, few
of us would be capable of detecting all patently false assertions regarding high-
energy physics. However, there is an important additional consideration here: very
174 See SCHAUER, supra note 70, at 28 (seeming to argue that this will be the usual result
of hearing false speech).
17' The category of speech at issue here is either innocent or negligent error: speech that
is false but which the utterer believes to be correct. The case of false propositions that are
insincerely uttered is discussed supra Part IV.
176 See GREENAWALT, supra note 97, at 48.
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few of us would take the word of an everyday person as authoritative on such highly
technical concepts without first inquiring as to the foundation for the claimed
expertise on such questions. Thus, on technical matters, few people would give
great weight to the testimony of a non-expert. By contrast, very few experts would
be likely to hold patently false beliefs in their area of expertise. 77 Thus, a com-
parable, patently false statement uttered by an expert would nearly always be an
insincere statement as well and would be analyzed separately.
It seems clear that hearing patently false speech will rarely be likely to cause
significant epistemic harm and that typically the positive consequences of learning
that some people hold such strange beliefs will strongly outweigh the low risk that
we might be taken in by such assertions. The next category, false beliefs that are
almost universally held, is problematic to the extent that it is difficult to provide
examples of such beliefs. This difficulty points out a deeper problem; if we
pervasively believe false things, it may be very difficult to identify and refute them.
Certainly a legal rule would have difficulty applying itself to such cases. Obviously,
such cases are deeply epistemically distressful given that they imply serious
roadblocks in our search for knowledge. Nevertheless, such cases resist analysis,
because if we had a way of describing such cases or giving examples of them, we
would no longer be dealing with pervasively false beliefs. Certainly we know that
177 Of course, a further qualification is needed here. It is often the case that non-experts set
themselves up to be experts, and sometimes large segments of the public believe them. For
instance, many religious authorities with little to no scientific training purport to be authorities
regarding the genesis and development of life and routinely make scientific claims that are far
beyond their field of expertise; many religious devotees likewise accept such claims without
the scrutiny that might ordinarily accrue to a non-expert in biological science. See, e.g.,
Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed, Believe It, or Not, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2003, at A29 (noting that
three times as many Americans believe in the virgin birth of Jesus as believe in the validity of
the theory of evolution). Such acceptance is troubling, in large part because it is likely to inhibit
the advance of true belief to a substantial degree. Nevertheless, I believe the real problem here
stems not from a simple failure of rationality in religious worshippers, but rather from complex
and deep-seated disagreements regarding the source of true belief and the proper nature of
epistemic justification. In other words, many religious believers no doubt think that the word
of a minister is superior to the word of a scientist even on scientific matters because they
believe that true beliefs are more likely to flow from revelation and religious meditation than
from empirical inquiry. This means that this situation is better treated as a contested issue of
belief than as an issue of patent falsity, even if most people we would regard as true "experts"
would argue that such assertions were patently false. Try as we might, it is unlikely that such
epistemic views would be alterable by any regulatory or constitutional interpretive strategy, and
even if we felt capable of achieving such a goal, the religion clauses of the First Amendment
would likely forbid such activity. Furthermore, attempting to alter such beliefs through coercion
would likewise violate political values such as respect for individual autonomy and self-
realization to an extraordinary and unpalatable degree. See discussion supra at Part I.B.iii. Thus,
even in such epistemically distressing situations, free discussion is a better recourse than any
strategy of government coercion or suppression.
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such beliefs exist, because we can analyze past beliefs and identify universally held
beliefs we now know on better evidence to be false (for instance, the notion of an
earth-centric universe). The most we can say about them is that to the extent we
hold such beliefs, we are likely to (incorrectly) view the corresponding true belief
that contradicts them as false. To that extent, protecting falsity will work an epistemic
benefit because it will enable us to hear (even if we think it absurd) the true beliefs
when they are expressed. Therefore, it behooves us to protect contrary assertions
regarding beliefs that are widely held, regardless of whether the beliefs we hold
happen to be true or false.
Finally, we must deal with the more complex case: false assertions on matters
whose truth is disputed. Here the harm is more palpable; given that one type of
evidence we routinely use in making truth judgments is an assessment of the weight
of opinion on either side of a question,'78 an increase in the number of people
propounding a false belief has some tendency to induce incorrect beliefs in those
who hear it and (erroneously) find the report to be credible. 179 For instance, the false
assertion given in the rain example (by a colleague who wrongly believes that it is
raining outside) does tend to induce a false belief in a hearer. Thus, the key question
is whether false speech on disputed matters has an epistemic value that outweighs
this harm.
Mill argued that falsity would help us develop a deeper understanding of truth;
however, he spent relatively little time explaining how in fact it would do so and
used only illustrations involving matters so complex that they may not have
involved truth values at all. 80 What is absent from scholarship to date is an
argument addressed to an intermediate case between the highly complex religious
assertions discussed by Mill and the obvious truths or untruths discussed above.
Goldman's argument on the veritistic merit of argument helps to illustrate how
Mill's approach might work on this more pragmatic level.'
8
'
The first important point is that, on disputed questions that interest us, it will be
very rare for there to be speakers on only one side of a question. Politicians may
make one claim, but their opponents will assert another. Manufacturers will make
positive claims about their products that will be disputed by competitors or by
consumer advocates. Thus, for the most part, competing ideas will be championed
by interested parties in the same way that attorneys champion opposite claims of fact
in legal disputes.
178 See Goldman, supra note 158, at 97-102.
179 See GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 117 (using Bayesian reasoning to show that we will
not improve the state of our knowledge when we rely on erroneous estimates of credibility);
SCHAUER, supra note 70, at 28 (arguing that the main risk flowing from the expression of
false speech is that it will be accepted as true and acted upon).
180 See MILL, supra note 1, at 30-47; see STEPHEN, supra note 7, at 76.
's' See GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 144-48.
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Once we have two or more individuals advocating opposing claims of fact, we
have Goldman's description of argumentation, as long as a few more conditions
apply. First, those arguing must assert premises that are true."s2 To some extent, of
course, those engaged in a dispute may be able to assure this premise by assailing
those of their opponents' premises that seem doubtful, thus generating a
subargument that may help to improve the accuracy of views with respect to the
subquestion. Likewise, proper conditions for veritistically useful argument require
that listeners be able to assess the validity of reasoning." 3 Those with strong views
are likely to assail the reasonableness of arguments, however, and this will help
listeners to identify faulty links between premises and conclusions.
Proper argument has the extremely useful feature of increasing our available
evidence.' It harnesses the interest of persons on either side of a dispute to ferret
out new and important facts that help us improve the accuracy of our assessments
with regard to the disputed questions. It helps to discover when premises that seem
plausible are in fact false or when reasoning that seems valid is in fact faulty.8 5 But
argument about factual propositions only takes place when someone is arguing for
a proposition that happens to be false.8 6
2. False Statements Concerning Verifiable Facts
But perhaps this is unsatisfying because it is somewhat abstract. After all, some
disputed facts are rather simple things; is it really likely that argument will increase the
depth of our understanding with respect to simple facts? Surprisingly, the answer is
yes, as long as the dispute centers on conflicting positions that are truly believed by
the disputants. For whenever we hear an earnest disagreement, we learn biographical
propositions about the disputants: we learn that they disagree. And this fact, in and
of itself, communicates that there is room for disagreement on a proposition and hence
that something we had previously been sure of might need investigation.
This modest epistemic advance might not be enough to outweigh the risk that
we will believe the false assertion rather than the true. But hearing a disagreement
182 See id. at 146.
183 See id.
'4 See id. at 145-46.
185 See id.
186 If neither side believed the false proposition, then the true premises requirement for
veritistically good argument would be violated because one party would be employing
insincere assertions. Because insincere assertions of even true propositions incorporate false
biographical assertions regarding the speaker's belief, such argument would incorporate false
premises. See Smith, supra note 106, at 712-13. Nor would such deception be veritistically
harmless; one important element of our weighing of competing views involves an assessment
of authorities on either side, and even a good faith assertion of a view we do not believe
deprives an audience of an opportunity to properly assess the weight of authoritative belief.
1241
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
about even simple facts is likely to spark something more useful: a discussion that
brings out the reasons for disagreement. This type of discussion both increases our
confidence about a final result and deepens our understanding about the circum-
stances that produced the disagreement, possibly allowing us to learn entirely new
and useful facts. As an argument proceeds between people who disagree, the
reasons supporting either's belief will be offered and critically examined." 7 If
defeater evidence exists that undermines an opponent's argument, it will likewise
be introduced and examined. 188 At the end of such a conversation, both the
participants and any hearers will be in possession of a larger number of facts than
before the argument had occurred. They will have seen an exploration of the
probable truth of many of these facts, as well as a critical examination of the logic
of either side's presentation. 189 Because a greater subset of evidence is generally
more likely to favor true propositions than false propositions,"g both disputants and
audience will be in a better position to evaluate the likelihood that even mundane
facts are true, than if there had been no false assertion and subsequent argument.
Those who already believe the true facts will come to believe those facts with
greater confidence, which is an important veritistic advance.'9 ' Those who hold
false beliefs, by contrast, will tend to have them either changed or weakened as they
are confronted with the greater body of evidence, which is an even more valuable.
For instance, imagine a simple dispute about the weather. Person A maintains
that it is raining, while Person B maintains that it is not (both work in a basement
office where the answer to the question is not obvious). Both are interested in the
answer to this question because they are trying to decide whether to go out for lunch
or order in. In such a situation, once the initial positions (one true and one false) are
set out, the conversation will almost immediately turn to evidence, the reasons each
have for their beliefs. Suppose that A's evidence on the question is that it was
raining when he stepped outside for a paper thirty minutes ago. His dialogue with
B could alter his belief and deepen their collective knowledge in a number of ways:
B could inform A that he stepped outside five minutes ago and that the sky was
clear. A would learn that it was no longer raining, and both would learn that it was
raining not too long ago (and that therefore it might be raining again soon).
187 See GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 139-44.
188 See id. at 139-40.
189 Cf. id. at 145-46. Goldman never explicitly makes this point, but it is implicit in his
connection between the TEP and the veritistic benefits of defeater argumentation.
90 Id. at 145; see CARNAP, supra note 160, at 211-13; Lee Epstein & Gary King, The
Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 38-41, 45-46 (2002).
191 See SCHAUER, supra note 70, at 18 (noting that ninety-nine percent assurance of a true
fact is better than fifty-five percent assurance); cf. MILL, supra note 1, at 37 (arguing that
without hearing falsehoods, belief in truth becomes rote and mechanical, lacking in the
vitality of an activated belief).
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B could inform A that he thought it was clear on the basis of having stepped
outside an hour ago; B would learn that it was raining as of thirty minutes ago (and
thus, probably still raining), and both would learn that it was raining intermittently.
B could inform A that he thought it was clear on the basis of a weather report
he had believed to be quite reliable. B would learn it was recently raining, and both
would learn that the particular weather report was less reliable than B had supposed.
B could tell A that he had believed it was clear on the basis of the report of a
coworker (C), who swore thirty minutes ago that it was clear. Upon investigating
the matter, both A and B might learn that C is a lying practical joker who thinks it
is funny to fool people regarding the weather.
Another excellent example of the veritistic advantage produced by an argument
over a factual disagreement was provided by Lawrence Solum. Imagine the
following exchange:
Speaker: Please open that window.
Listener: No, it doesn't open.
Speaker: Yes, it does. I opened it yesterday.
Listener: No, it doesn't. I tried this morning.
Speaker: Yes, but do you know the trick of thumping the latch?
Listener: No, I didn't. Let me try.192
Each step before the last in the exchange involves a new defeater, a premise that
undermines the evidence on which the other party is basing the truth determination.
As this argument proceeds, each party learns about the other side's evidence, comes
to understand the root of the disagreement, and, probably, comes to a more certain
view regarding the window's condition. Note that all of the above examples depend
on a false assertion being made; without the falsity, there is no argument and no
increase in the evidence needed to form a more accurate set of beliefs. The false
statement is the signal that shows the existence of disagreement, creates the
motivation to inquire further into the matter through the tools of argument, and
begins the process that leads to a gain in knowledge for both parties. It is this
powerful property of false statements that forms the basis of Mill's best reply to J.F.
Stephen who criticized Mill for failing to use simple examples when he elaborated
the virtues of hearing false speech: 93 it is not the simple denial of a basic fact that
brings an advance in knowledge, but the attempt to resolve that disagreement and
the consequential exploration of the reasons for it. It is in this sense that we should
understand Mill's claim that disagreement deepens our understanding of truth. 94
192 Lawrence Byard Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 54,95 (1989).
193 See STEPHEN, supra note 7, at 76.
194 MILL, supra note 1, at 30-31.
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Disagreement is likely to bring out the good reasons for our true beliefs, possible
flaws in the reasoning used to support even correct beliefs, and altogether unrelated
truths that explain the existing disagreement.
3. Unequal Access to Supporting Evidence
However, there is a wrinkle here. These simple examples have all involved
scenarios where the reasoning necessary to understand the basis of a truth claim is
highly accessible to any reasonably competent adult. In these sorts of cases, erroneous
premises are likely to be quickly discovered, and the steps of reasoning involved are
accessible to all participants. The harder cases involve arguments about subjects
where important evidence is unavailable to those who might wish to engage in an
argument, limiting their ability to challenge the factual validity of premises, or
arguments on subjects where the reasoning leading from valid premises to a valid
conclusion is simply too abstruse for most people to follow. Either situation might
imperil the ability of argumentation to lead towards an increase in knowledge. 
195
The truth-tropic features of argumentation depend on the ability of participants
to challenge the other side's evidence premises; otherwise, we cannot be confident
that those premises are true. 96 Therefore, when the underlying data necessary to do
so are not available to both sides, we have less reason to rely on argument to
increase the accuracy of our beliefs because a crucial condition, reliance on true
premises by both sides, is less likely to be true. One paradigmatic example of such
a situation is where one side is lying regarding their evidence. Not only does such
a situation increase the likelihood that the propositions themselves are false, it also
insulates those propositions from scrutiny by the other side.
But an opponent does not have to be lying to be relying on inaccessible premises
that cannot easily be verified. For instance, imagine a dispute regarding the exis-
tence of an unusual purple albatross. Person A argues that this fantastic creature
exists on the basis of his observations while sailing at dangerously high southern
latitudes. A might earnestly believe that his observation is real and not the product
of a hallucination brought on by food poisoning and lack of sleep. B, an albatross
expert who doubts the existence of such a creature, is not without tools to assail A
in an argument. He can argue that no other explorer has seen such a creature and
that this makes its existence unlikely, although not impossible. He might further
argue that sailors in such extreme conditions are known to have had hallucinations
in the past. Indeed, we might feel that the unverifiable nature of A's data makes it
more likely to be a fraud or an illusion. But in the end, the private nature of A's
experiential data makes that aspect of his argument hard to verify and reduces the
veritistic utility of argument on this point.
195 See GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 144-46.
'96 See id.
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Most likely, there are many similar cases in which access to information is
asymmetric in this way. 197 In some cases, this will be irremediable, such as in cases
where one party's memory provides crucial evidence premises that are not externally
verifiable-as in the above example. However, in many other cases, such as claims
regarding physical objects or processes in one party's control, asymmetric access
can be corrected by a disclosure rule mandating sufficient access so that the other
side can investigate and either verify or refute the other's evidence premises. One
example of such a rule is embodied in the modern discovery practice created by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provide both parties with broad access to
the other side's supporting evidence and to information that might undermine
opposing claims. 98 Other examples include the extensive disclosure required of the
issuer of publicly traded securities regarding their internal financial situation'99 or
the scientific practice of making data and methods used in generating a conclusion
publicly available for examination, in order to facilitate attempts to independently
verify results.2°° If the defect in access to supporting evidence can be corrected, then
we may regain the knowledge-producing advantages of argument. The frequent
resort to disclosure rules in situations of unequal access to information helps to
illustrate this principle.
4. Asymmetric Analytic Capacities and Expert Speech
The second complication to the beneficence of argument arises when we cannot
be sure that the link between premises and conclusion is valid.201 Since the TEP-based
theory of the utility of argument depends upon a valid link between premises and
conclusions offered on both sides,20 2 the inability to scrutinize that link may mean
that we cannot be confident that those engaged in an argument are linking evidence
to conclusion in an appropriate way.
In many cases, those engaged in argument will be able to identify such problems
when they occur, so that the relevant audience can realize the danger and avoid
being taken in by a flawed argument. If A is trying to show that he owns a red
wheelbarrow, offers as his only evidence that he very much enjoys the poetry of
'9' See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772
n.24 (1976) (arguing that commercial speech ought to be less protected because it is more
easily verifiable by an advertiser, and implicitly, less easily verifiable to members of the
public); see also Kozinski & Banner, supra note 60, at 635-38 (criticizing this argument).
118 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
199 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78m, 78o(d) (Supp. V 2005) (Exchange Act Sections 12,
13, and 15(d) which impose a variety of periodic disclosure requirements on issuers of
securities).
200 See Epstein & King, supra note 190, at 38-41, 45-46.
201 See GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 144-46.
202 Id.
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William Carlos Williams, and asserts that this proves his ownership, most listeners
would balk. Clearly, most of us are competent to assess the relationship between
liking a poem about a red wheelbarrow and actually owning one. Thus, for most
arguments on everyday matters, we are all fairly competent at assessing the sorts of
reasoning that accord with common sense. Of course, in some cases, we may all
employ mental shortcuts that diverge from strict rationality and that may therefore
distort some of our conclusions.2 3 However, such heuristics may well have minimal
impact on the processes of truth-seeking; some evidence exists to show that the
biases we display in laboratory conditions have more to do with the artificiality of
such scenarios than persistent defects in our reasoning.2 4
But there are definitely cases where our everyday ability to judge the links
between evidence and conclusions will not help us; a wide variety of arguments
require substantial expertise to be comprehended. For instance, neither I nor most
readers of this Article are capable of adequately assessing the relationship between
the premises and the conclusion of Andrew Wiles's proof of Fermat's Last
Theorem, even after assuring ourselves that all of his premises were true.20 5 This
failure does not result from defects in our rationality but from the simple fact that
the proof uses methods of reasoning that require special mathematical training to
appreciate. Numerous examples of such inaccessible arguments could probably be
found in every discipline with specialized knowledge and methods of reasoning. In
an argument between a mathematician who comprehends Wiles's proof and a lay
person, a defect in Wiles's argument would probably not be detected through the
process of argumentation. Thus, such an argument would not involve appropriate
assurances that the rule requiring an adequate relationship between premises and
evidence was being followed.
Does this mean that argumentation is not a knowledge-producing exercise when
expert knowledge is involved? No, for several reasons. First, and most obviously,
the expert might correct the non-expert on errors that are within the non-expert
203 See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 4-20
(Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (describing the shortcuts frequently used in human cognition
and the ways that these shortcuts can cause us to reach conclusions that are less than
perfectly rational).
204 See GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 230-33 (reviewing literature on cognitive biases that
suggests that the deviations observed by experimenters such as Kahneman and Tversky may
have more to do with the abstracted experimental conditions than with real deficiencies in
human rationality and that the experiments may have incorporated fallacious ideas
concerning probabilities).
205 See Gerd Faltings, The Proof of Fermat's Last Theorem by R. Taylor and A. Wiles, 4
NOTICES OF THE AMS 743 (1995) (providing a summary of the proof for other
mathematicians); Andrew Wiles, Modular Elliptic Curves and Fermat's Last Theorem, 142
ANNAL OF MATHEMATICS 443 (1995) (part of the original proof); Charles Daney, The
Mathematics of Fermat's Last Theorem, http://cgd.best.vwh.net/home/flt/fltmain.htm (last
visited Mar. 4, 2008) (giving an accessible summary of the proof).
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audience's comprehension, thus leading to a veritistic gain, so long as the expert was
speaking honestly. More importantly, however, an argument between experts can
promote knowledge even among a non-expert audience. First, assuming that neither
expert is misrepresenting his own opinion, an audience will learn an important fact:
informed experts disagree on this particular point. For many lay people on many
topics, the knowledge that the jury is still out on a question may be the most useful
information we can acquire. Given the fact that we are unlikely to be able to
understand the intricacies being debated by the experts, learning that they
disagree-and getting an impression of the rough weight of expert opinion on an
issueE26-may be the best we can do to form correct beliefs on such a question.
But this does not end our inquiry, because the relevant question is not whether
hearing a dispute between experts produces any gain in knowledge at all, but
whether it produces more gain than a government policy suppressing the presumably
false opinion would bring. In analyzing the necessity for suppression, it is important
to make one distinction clear: the government can act on a particular set of factual
assumptions (assuming a sort of corporate belief state) without also needing to
suppress the contrary opinion. 207 The question is not when the government should
arrive at a particular conclusion, but rather when the government is justified in
attempting to impose its conclusion on the rest of us-if, indeed, this can ever be
justified. For the purpose of analyzing suppression of false expert opinions, there
are two possible situations: either expert opinion is significantly divided, or expert
opinion is unanimous or nearly unanimous on one side of the question.
When expert opinion is divided, there are three key harms that would occur
from suppressing one side of the debate, even when the side suppressed is false.
First, the government could well be wrong; especially on a question that divides
experts, we should tread very lightly before assuming that we have the final answer.
The drive to demonstrate that presently persuasive scientific opinions are in fact
untrue is one of the great motivating principles of scientific advance, and we do
ourselves harm if we act as if that strong skeptical tendency were not an important
foundation of our scientific understandings.2 °8 Second, the experts whose opinion
will be suppressed may be disincentivized from researching on that side of the
question, even if the suppression is less than total and experts are allowed to
communicate with each other. One important drive for all of us, experts included,
is the drive for credit and acclaim.2° If experts are precluded from informing the
206 See GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 81-82 (discussing the importance of weighing expert
opinion accurately as a means for non-experts to form true beliefs on expertised subjects);
Goldman, supra note 158, at 97-102 (same).
207 See MILL, supra note 1, at 22-23.
208 See KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DIsCOVERY 268-69 (2002) (discussing
the process of corroborating scientific hypotheses through repeated tests aimed at falsifying
a theory).
209 See GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 260-63.
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public about their results, they may be discouraged from pursuing particular avenues
of research. If this were to happen, then the expert community would be deprived
of the epistemic advantages that argument brings.2'0 Finally, the public would be
deprived of important evidence; it would fail to learn that the expert community was
divided, a critical piece of data if they are to form appropriate likelihood estimates and
not believe these propositions with more certainty than is presently appropriate.2
Even when expert opinion is unanimous, or nearly so, all three of the above
concerns are still valid. First, unanimity of opinion does not always indicate
certainty of belief. Indeed, many of the most important moments in the history of
science have involved major revisions in understanding that brushed aside widely
adopted orthodoxies.21 2 Nor is it the case that major revisions of technical belief
occur only at the level of high theory. For instance, an overwhelming scientific
consensus existed for the view that human beings had forty-eight chromosomes
until, as microscopic technology improved, a few dissenting voices began to
challenge that orthodoxy and suggest that there were only forty-six-the number we
now know to be correct.213 Thus, even in the case of substantial agreement among
experts, we still risk suppressing a true opinion when we restrict dissenting views.
Second, given the importance of challenging orthodoxy and the difficulty of getting
anyone, including experts, to do it, 214 we should be especially wary of taking actions
that might discourage scientific investigation by stigmatizing the work of those who
are willing to challenge widely prevailing views. Finally, when the public is largely
aware of the scientific consensus, hearing the dissenting view, and thereby learning
that what might have been certain is in fact subject to some doubt, may be of
exceptional epistemic value. Thus, the rationales for protecting potentially false
expert opinions apply both where the subject of the opinion is disputed and when
there is broad consensus on one side of the question.
There is still one point of difficulty with regard to the value of false speech on
technical issues, however. The veritistic gains that accrue from hearing experts
debate technical issues relies upon our being able to determine the weight of expert
210 Within the community of experts, the premises-conclusion relationship can be probed
just as with an ordinary question.
211 See Goldman, supra note 158, at 97-102.
212 See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 12-22, 102--03
(3d ed. 1996).
213 See Stanley M. Gartler, The Chromosome Number in Humans: A Brief History, 7
NATUREREVS. GENETICS 655,656-58 (2006) (noting that scientists continued to count forty-
eight chromosomes for some time after the technology had developed to clearly show that
only forty-six existed).
214 See KUHN, supra note 212, at 24 (noting that scientists do not normally invent new
theories and that they are often intolerant of those who do); MILL, supra note 1, at 45
(suggesting that the values of dissenting argument, even where opinion is nearly unanimous,
are so great that we should endeavor to simulate vigorous dissent when no one is ready to
supply it in actuality).
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opinion. This rationale has less force when applied to discussions between experts
and non-experts who are pretending to be experts. Some such cases will involve the
misrepresentation of the non-expert party's credentials and thus will be cases of
insincerity, not honest error. These cases will be discussed below. But on other
occasions, non-experts may believe themselves qualified to discuss an issue, may
make no misrepresentations regarding their qualifications, and may nevertheless
persuade some members of the public to adopt their ill-informed view. A common
example of this involves religious authorities who present themselves as experts on
scientific topics such as the genesis and evolution of life and are accepted by some
followers as such.215
Even in these cases, there is still knowledge to be gained through the discussion.
The expert may respond to common misconceptions contained in the non-expert's
arguments and thus improve the state of public knowledge on the topic. By contrast,
although this is by no means universally true, most of us do not blindly adopt
opinions on technical matters offered by those with no apparent qualifications; we
are unlikely to accept a plumber's opinion on matters of biology, or vice versa,
absent some evidence of special qualifications in that field. This suggests that, when
those non-experts continue to be influential, we are dealing either with deception
regarding their qualifications or a more fundamental disagreement regarding the
types of expertise and evidence that are appropriate bases for influencing our
beliefs.21 6 The arguments of religious authorities may be an excellent example of
such a scenario; followers may believe that due to religious beneficence, the
statements of a minister are more authoritative than those of a scientist, even within
the scientist's special domain of expertise. It is unlikely that we would be able to
alter such beliefs through selective suppression of non-expert opinion on such
matters, even if the First Amendment's speech or religion clauses allowed us to
engage in such selective suppression of religious speech. Thus, there does not seem
to be a strong case for excepting the speech of non-experts from the general
principle that advocacy of false views will generally produce more knowledge via
its power to drive argumentation than the suppression of those false views.
Even in cases where argument is unlikely to increase our immediate access to
truth, it can still provide other social epistemic benefits, specifically through
developing the analytic capacities of the citizenry. Enabling the citizenry to develop
its capacities is an important First Amendment goal,217 and engaging in and hearing
argumentation is a key way that the citizenry can develop its capacity for analyzing
2,5 See supra note 177.
216 See supra note 177.
27 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Adversary System, Democratic Theory, and the
Constitutional Role of Self-Interest: The Tobacco Wars, 1953-1971, 51 DEPAUL L. REV.
359, 370 (2001) (discussing the importance of the self-development value in democratic
theory); Redish, supra note 118, at 593 (discussing the connection between the self-
development value and the protection of free expression).
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competing truth claims.218 First, hearing disagreements forces the citizen to take an
active and skeptical role in assessing arguments; this may serve him well in his quest
to improve the general state of his knowledge in order that he might live a satisfying
life. Moreover, it may help him better exercise the factual judgment that is
necessary when analyzing competing policy proposals during election cycles,
enabling him to make more informed choices in his vital role as a democratic
sovereign. 19 Likewise, both in their individual and sovereign capacities, it may
benefit citizens to grow more aware of the error factor in all human calculations.22
Just as epistemological humility is an important value in a government,22' it is an
important value in a citizenry, having the general effect of discouraging rash and
impulsive action before adequate evidence is available and promoting tolerance
towards those who have reached opposing conclusions on similar evidence. 222 Thus,
the benefits of argumentation extend beyond the issues under discussion; they help
to develop habits of thought that are likely to promote both a more critical and a
more tolerant society.
There is, however, one narrow exception to the principles developed above
regarding the generally valuable nature of false speech on matters requiring
expertise; there are situations in which false statements are not very likely to
produce any sort of useful argument but instead are expected to be relied upon by
a listener without a great deal of reflection.223 When we retain an attorney to render
confidential advice on a legal question, for instance, we typically expect to rely on
her advice and do not anticipate a need to obtain independent verification or
critiques of her views. Given the confidential nature of this relation, and the lack
of other experts who are privy to the relevant facts and the opinions offered by our
attorney, it would be very difficult for any useful argument to arise and correct a
false statement. Furthermore, the promissory nature of the relationship, in which an
advisor is receiving compensation in return for rendering competent advice, removes
some of the value we might ordinarily place in allowing her to speak her mind
218 See MILL, supra note 1, at 36 (noting that competition in ideas is necessary for the
maintenance of an intellectually active people).
219 See MEKLEJOHN, supra note 113, at 25 (noting the importance of developing voter
wisdom as well as voter knowledge).
220 Cf. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting
that even scientists often have vigorous and sincere disagreements about the subjects under
their study).
221 See Redish, supra note 118, at 383 (noting the value of precluding the government
from assuming a posture of certainty regarding highly contestable issues of moral truth).
222 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 120 (1986) (noting that developing tolerant habits in the
citizenry is an important First Amendment goal).
223 See GREENAWALT, supra note 97, at 316 (stating that innocently false statements
should be immunized unless made to a listener who should not be expected to do further
independent checking).
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without conducting adequate verification first. Thus, it is quite possible that in this
and analogous situations (such as confidential advice from accountants or other
retained expert advisors) liability for negligently-made false statements would
produce a net veritistic gain, rather than bringing about the harms to our knowledge
that such a restriction would bring if imposed more broadly.224
The foregoing discussion has set out the reasons why argument will produce
good consequences for the state of our knowledge even when the logic linking
premises to conclusions is complex or technical. With this step being reasonably
well established, the general principle becomes fairly clear: in all the circumstances
thus far surveyed, argument is likely to produce more knowledge than suppression,
and this holds to the extent that the views that are advocated in argument are in fact
believed by their advocates. The one major exception we have seen involves cases
where one side seeks to support their argument with premises that are not easily
open to investigation or dispute by opposing advocates and are expected to be relied
upon without further investigation.
Previously, I argued that there was a persistent gap in the theory of free
expression's application to false speech: a failure to carefully assess the degree to
which false speech is harmful. In this Section, I have set forth the view that
restricting sincere speech on account of its falsity impoverishes us epistemically by
foreclosing arguments that would increase the sum total of our knowledge. When
combined with the autonomy and self-realization values that militate against
forbidding people to say what they earnestly believe,225 the conclusion that little
harm will generally result from sincerely-believed false speech lends strong support
to the argument that such speech should receive First Amendment protection.
Furthermore, although it might seem that there would be an exception in situations
where access to supporting evidence was asymmetric, 226 this is not the case. Rather,
subject to the confidential advice exception discussed above, a rule requiring
disclosure of the inaccessible information infringes less on our interest in increasing
our knowledge than does a rule of outright suppression, because such a rule permits
argumentation to occur with its correlative epistemic advantages.
This Section has set forth the rationale for giving strong, although not absolute,
First Amendment protection to most false statements that are believed to be true by
a speaker. Next, I will address the reason why the First Amendment should not
generally protect speech that is insincere.
224 A distinction of a similar type is already recognized in the law of tortious
misrepresentation, which provides for a lowered standard of fault in cases involving a false
statement made by a professional advisor in the course of her business. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 & cmt. I (1977); see also, e.g., Private Mortgage Inv. Serv., Inc.
v. Hotel & Club Assocs., 296 F.3d 308 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing liability for negligent
misrepresentation in a professional appraisal).
225 See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
226 See discussion supra Part I.B.3; see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772 (1976).
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IV. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF INSINCERE SPEECH
The relationship between falsity and insincerity has proved quite problematic in
First Amendment doctrine. In some circumstances, the Supreme Court has required
both insincerity and falsity before the First Amendment can be overcome; 227 in others,
the Court has stated or held that perfectly sincere false statements can be subjected
to liability.228 In the previous Section, I argued that falsity alone should rarely be
enough to justify suppression of speech, because although false speech can cause
some harm to our knowledge, that harm is usually outweighed by the power of false
speech to drive knowledge-augmenting argumentation. This Section will discuss
how a mismatch between a speaker's belief state and his assertion alters this calculus;
in other words, it will address the difference between lying and erring. The
discussion will show that insincere statements are entitled to little constitutional
protection in their own right, although such statements may sometimes need modest
protections in order to avoid chilling sincere speech.
A. Insincerity and the Problem of Asymmetric Access to Information
At the outset, we might wonder whether lies are in fact valuable. After all, we
have seen that false speech has value, and telling lies is one easy way to assure that
we will speak falsely. Indeed, Mill seemed at one point to argue in favor of such a
view, when he noted that if we lacked advocates of dissenting views, we would do
well to create artificial advocacy of dissenting views in order to capture some of the
value that advocacy of false views provides us. 229
But reflection shows that this simple argument for the value of insincere speech
does not have merit. Although insincerity is itself a form of false speech (because
every assertion includes an implied assertion of belief),23° it lacks most of the
features that make sincerely-believed false speech worth protecting.23' First, as
227 E.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (imposing actual
malice rule on defamation actions arising out of criticism of public officials). All speech that
falls within the actual malice rule is insincere speech because knowing or reckless falsity
involves a misrepresentation of belief states. See discussion supra Part H.A. But not all
insincere speech is made with actual malice, because assertions that a speaker neither
believes nor disbelieves are not "probably false" but are insincere. See St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-33 (1968).
228 E.g., Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749,757-61 (1985); Va. State
Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 (stating that false or misleading commercial speech
could be restricted without reference to knowledge of falsity).
229 See MILL, supra note 1, at 39, 45.
230 See Smith, supra note 106, at 712-13.
231 But see SCHAUER, supra note 70, at 159-60 (arguing that a speaker's state of mind
should have little bearing on the First Amendment inquiry).
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discussed above, most theorists to consider the question have concluded that
insincerity deprives false speech of most of the value that it would have from the
standpoint of moral and political theory.232 Insincere assertions do not further our
interest in governing ourselves through a free and open exchange of information and
ideas, because they involve the betrayal of the public interest, not argument made
in service of it.233 Likewise, because the coercive nature of insincere speech robs
another of the ability to exercise her own autonomy, insincere statements exist
outside the sphere of autonomy that Kantian moral theorists argue should be a
ground for constitutional protection.234  An individual's dignitary interest in
speaking his mind cannot extend to the willful manipulation of others.235 Thus,
many of the intangible values that justify the protection of sincerely-believed false
speech do not support the protection of deliberate lies as well.
In addition to these considerations of political theory, insincere speech is also
different from ordinary false speech because it will generally harm the state of our
knowledge more than it will help. Falsity is valuable not in a direct sense, but for
the indirect benefit it brings by provoking argument, which tends to augment our
knowledge.236 Insincere statements, when they contain assertions with which others
disagree, are just as likely as other false statements to give rise to argument.
However, we can only reliably expect argument to increase our knowledge when we
have ways of assuring that the premises are true and that they support the conclusion
in a reliable way.237 As we shall see, insincerity tends to undercut the first prerequisite
for the value of argument.
First, insincerity undermines our ability to be confident that the premises
asserted on either side of an argument are true. As previously discussed, those who
participate in argument frequently assail their opponents' premises, and when there
is fairly equal epistemic access to the premises asserted in argument, that scrutiny
can give us some assurance that argument is likely to increase our knowledge.238
One factor that undermines this ability is when one side is at a significant
disadvantage in its ability to assess the factual validity of an opponent's premises.
Insincere speech is a special case of this situational defect in argumentation; we are
always disadvantaged in our access to an opponent's premises when he is
misrepresenting his belief state to us.
The reasons why insincerity undercuts our ability to probe the truth of an
opponent's premises are twofold. First, insincerity directly introduces a premise
into argument which eludes argumentative scrutiny. An insincere statement in fact
232 See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
233 See Meiklejohn, supra note 117, at 259.
234 See Strauss, supra note 108, at 354.
235 See GREENAWALT, supra note 97, at 48, 132.
236 See discussion supra Part III.A.
237 GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 144-46.
231 Id. at 140.
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contains two important assertions: a statement about the world-which may be true
or false, although it is usually false-and an implied statement about the speaker's
belief state concerning that first assertion, which is always false. 239 Both assertions
are important, given that we will frequently rely on another person's belief in a
premise as important evidence that it is true, especially when that person has some
expertise or personal knowledge on the matter. But regardless of how easy it may
be to verify the factual assertion, the assertion of belief eludes verification, hidden
as it is within the speaker's own mind. To be sure, it is not impossible to come to
a reasonable conclusion regarding a speaker's belief-after all, the law frequently
requires us to determine the mens rea of defendants who refuse to testify on the
subject-but it is nevertheless a highly challenging endeavor, requiring us to
compare a speaker's assertion with voluminous evidence concerning his knowledge,
actions, and past statements. By contrast, the speaker's access to his own deceptive
belief state is immediate; indeed, there are few things we can know with more
confidence than our own internal mental states, at least when we are paying attention
to them.240 This means that any discussion in which one speaker is speaking
insincerely involves a dramatic information asymmetry arising out of the serious
difficulties involved in verifying an opponent's biographical assertions. This
information asymmetry means that the false biographical assertions which serve as
implied premises in any argument are unlikely to be caught and corrected.
There is a second, even more troubling way that insincerity undercuts our ability
to be confident in the truth of premises. When one is being insincere, one is
generally not approaching the argument in good faith; rather, one is trying to subvert
the argument based on a goal of winning, without regard to the persuasive merit of
one's true position. Once one has decided to breach the norms of proper argument
by asserting propositions one does not believe,24' there is little reason to refrain from
also choosing those premises that will be difficult for an opponent to refute. Such
an approach will likely be desirable because it will prevent the insincerity from
being discovered. If we can tailor our lies so that they will not be incompatible with
our opponent's knowledge, we can thereby insulate them from being corrected.242
239 LYCAN, supra note 129, at 106; Grice, supra note 130, at 168; Smith, supra note 106,
at 712-13.
240 See AUDI, supra note 145, at 84-85 (noting the difficulties involved in arguing that we
can be mistaken about our own mental states when we are trying to attend to them).
241 See GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 134, 140 (believing one's premises is a norm of
proper argumentation); Grice, supra note 130, at 168 (believing one's statements to be true
represents a conversational maxim and is understood as an implied assertion flowing with
all conversation that is not conspicuously flouting those maxims).
242 Cf PETER LIPTON, INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION 164-83 (2d ed. 2004)
(discussing the related proposition that scientific theories are less verified when they are
"predicting" data they were designed to accommodate on the grounds that the fit is as easily
explained by the accommodation as by the truth of the theory).
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For example, imagine that there is at present a dispute concerning whether a
strange phenomenon observed in the sky during recent weeks is better explained by
the presence of alien visitors or by more typical meteorological phenomena. If my
desire to convince others of the alien thesis is stronger than my desire to observe the
normal rules of argument, I might decide that it is worthwhile to invent evidence to
achieve this end. I am unlikely, then, to choose to invent evidence that will be easily
detected as false. Thus, if I invent a fake sighting, I will be careful to make it match
up to reports I have encountered previously. I will also be careful to invent a
sighting that, if true, would not have been seen by someone else, so as to avoid
having counter-evidence introduced. If I set up my false account properly, it will
be verifiable primarily through my own or my confederate's testimony, relying on
the baseline expectation of others that I will be speaking honestly, with that
reliability buttressed by its correspondence with existing data. Thus, having decided
to lie, I will most likely choose to invent stories that will exploit information
asymmetries in order to be as convincing as possible.
Thus, insincere statements will tend to undermine the verifiability-of-premises
condition for knowledge-producing argument. In the previous Section, I argued that
dangerous information asymmetries can often be corrected through a disclosure rule
and that a disclosure rule that facilitates argument will be more useful for increasing
our knowledge than a suppression rule. But such a rule has no application to
asymmetries produced by insincerity. It is meaningless to talk of being insincere but
also disclosing the insincerity, because the disclosure effectively cancels the
insincere statements. Thus, requiring disclosure of insincerity is functionally
equivalent to suppressing insincere speech. There does not seem to be a way, in
other words, to avoid the destructive consequences of insincerity for knowledge-
producing argument.
Thus, it seems as if the significant epistemic harm of insincere speech, when
compounded with its lack of other important First Amendment values,2" would suggest
a rule exempting all insincere speech from the protections of the First Amendment.
Such a rule would apply whenever the implied assertion of our belief state does not
match our actual belief state.2" It would cover not only occasions where speakers assert
statements that they do not believe (misrepresenting disbelief as belief), but also
statements impliedly asserting belief when in fact the speaker neither disbelieves nor
believes the statement but has merely suspended judgment on it.245
243 See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
244 See discussion supra Part II.A (defining sincerity as a correspondence between an
assertion and a belief state of the speaker).
245 In this respect it would exclude slightly more speech than the actual malice rule, which
extends only to speech that is known to be false or that is believed to be "probably false," which
mostly amounts to the same thing. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496,
510 (1991); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-33 (1968).
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Taking the previous Section along with this Section, then, we can make the
following general assertion: the First Amendment protects speech that is innocently
false in most cases, but it does not, as a general rule, protect speech that is insincere.
Having said this much, I must backpedal slightly: there are some complicated issues
relating to this simple principle that cannot be resolved in this space. For instance,
a rule based on sincerity butts up uncomfortably against the reality of corporate
speakers who may not have "beliefs" in the simple sense; although such cases can
probably be resolved through doctrines of implication, this Article will not discuss
in detail how these principles should be applied to such cases.246
B. Special Categories of Harnless Insincerity
A further wrinkle is that there may be some cases in which protections for
insincerity are appropriate. The first class of such cases involves insincere speech
that, for peculiar reasons, is not viewed as causing much harm. As Professor
Greenawalt has shown, not all lies are harmful. For instance, a "white" lie told to
spare someone's feelings may be of little consequence, especially when the listener
is not really interested in the "true" answer.247 It is important to note that such lies
often involve speech on questions of aesthetics to which truth value might not
attach, such as statements with respect to the positive attributes of a loved one as
compared with others. Likewise, although such statements do involve a misrepre-
sentation of biographical truth, it may not actually be the case that discussions of
such matters are primarily oriented at eliciting those biographical truths; rather, such
conversations may be more focused on a process of ritual affirmation that cements
our social bonds with one another. Thus, our comfort with lies on such topics may
reflect the fact that the emotional and social values present in such communication
are more important to us than the truth-seeking component. In such circumstances,
it is possible that the detriment to our knowledge may be minimal enough that it
would become reasonable to provide protection on the basis of other First
Amendment values. Such a conclusion does not follow from what I have argued
above, but it does reflect our intuitions that it would be enormously intrusive to
prohibit such "harmless" lies.248
246 For an introduction to some of the complexities involved in assessing corporate belief
states, see generally Eric Colvin, Corporate Personality and CriminalLiability, 6 CRIM. L.F.
1, 1-4 (1995).
247 GREENAWALT, supra note 97, at 50; see also Schauer & Zeckhauser, supra note 128,
at 7 (discussing white lies).
248 Most likely, such intuitions are shared so broadly that there will never be a live
constitutional question; white lies are most likely adequately protected from regulation by
the political process. Similar considerations likely apply to other sorts of "harmless" lies in
situations where we do not view truth as very important. GREENAWALT, supra note 97, at 50.
Greenawalt offers the example of lies told to protect others from harm, such as "the person
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Lies may also deserve protection in some cases for a very different reason:
certain narrow categories of lies may sometimes have strong epistemic value that can
outweigh their ability to harm us, as when lies are used to great advantage in
investigations of wrongful conduct by police officers or private individuals.249 When
a lie is used for investigative purposes, it may uncover much greater truths that make
the local epistemic distortion "worth it." A categorical rule would be difficult to
state here, as the epistemic benefits and costs would be highly variable on a
situational basis. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that such an exception
to the general principle announced above may exist, depending on specific factors
involved in particular types of investigative deceptions.
C. The Problem of Chilling Effects
Finally, there is a potential exception that is far more uncertain in its reach: a
prophylactic "exception" that tries to limit the risk of chilling some sincere speech
that might arise in a regime that permitted extensive regulation of insincere speech.
Such a concern is entirely proper and has motivated Supreme Court Justices to
express a desire to broadly protect even deliberate lies on certain topics.25° As the
concurrences in New York Times v. Sullivan noted, litigation is expensive business,
and proof of belief can be a complicated inquiry.2"' Potential defendants may
therefore decide not to speak sincerely in cases where they doubt their ability or
willingness to endure the pains of litigating their own veracity.
The Court's defamation jurisprudence to date has primarily been motivated by
a concern about the chilling effects of restricting falsity in speech, because with only
a few exceptions, the Court has shown little concern for the harms of successfully
restricting false speech in itself.252 Thus, the Court's actual malice rule, which we
you want to shoot is no longer in the house." Id. Another example involves the use of
placebos in therapeutic deceptions; if a deceptive treatment saves our lives, we are unlikely
to object to a small loss of knowledge. See Adam J. Kolber, A Limited Defense of Clinical
Placebo Deception, 26 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 75, 76-77 (2007). As with the "white lies,"
most such cases will not be real constitutional problems because it is hard to imagine
regulation in such areas, although the placebo issue is more likely to admit of government
restrictions. Id.
249 See Varat, supra note 108, at 1122-26.
250 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293-96 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring) (expressing concern that even under the majority's actual malice rule, the threat
of civil liability could effectively silence the press); id. at 300 (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(worrying that a rule permitting restriction of criticism of public officials based upon ajury's
evaluation of a defendant's state of mind would excessively constrain such criticism).
251 Id. at 293-96 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 300 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
252 See discussion supra Part I.A. 1. For the rare exception to this principle, see Sullivan,
376 U.S. at 279 n. 19 (quoting Mill for the proposition that false speech is valuable in itself
for its knowledge-producing effects).
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have seen is very similar to a rule that would be produced by a desire to interpret the
First Amendment so as to protect knowledge-producing speech, is largely premised
on this value. 3 The Court, however, has included a number of other protections on
defamation actions designed to limit chilling effects. These other protections have
focused more on procedure than substance, enabling most defamation actions that
satisfy the actual malice rule to go forward subject to limits on the quality of proof
that will be sufficient, substantial appellate scrutiny of proof of belief states, and
limits on the amount of damages that can be obtained.254 The effect of such rules is
to cut back on lawsuits that involve low levels of actual, quantifiable harm and to
restrict speculative lawsuits brought in an attempt to intimidate defendants into
silence by limiting the ability of plaintiffs to bring suits to court in the absence of
significant evidence of wrongdoing.
A concern about chilling sincere speech by regulating insincere speech is
consistent with the framework offered above. As I have previously argued, protecting
sincere speech, whether true or false, generally serves important First Amendment
purposes, both by helping to advance our knowledge and by promoting important
political theory values.255 Thus, when regulating insincere speech has the consequence
of deterring sincere speech, that regulation becomes constitutionally suspect.
However, we should not overstate such a principle. Insincere speech, as we have
seen, directly undermines our interest in furthering our knowledge, which in and of
itself represents an important free expression value.256
Thus, we would be acting contrary to important First Amendment values if we
imposed a broad rule prohibiting regulation of insincere speech on the basis of
chilling effects that are present only in some cases. The appropriate approach would
involve categorically balancing the epistemic gains and detriments of regulating
insincerity in different contexts, with a sharp eye towards the actual amount of
sincere speech that is likely to be deterred by a specific restriction. And although
we must be careful to remember that the costs imposed by chilling insincere speech
may be less salient than the harms caused by the insincerity, 257 we should not let a
253 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279.
254 See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-53 (1986) (imposing a
heightened burden of production); Bose Corp. v. Consumer's Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
514 (1984) (imposing more searching appellate review of key factual determinations); Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 331-32 (1974) (imposing limits on available damages).
255 See discussion supra Parts I.B.3, III.B. I am bracketing off, for the moment, any
discussion of the other reasons, such as a potential to do imminent harm, why even truthful
sincere speech will sometimes be unprotected, and focusing solely on situations in which we
would wish to protect sincere speech while leaving insincere speech unprotected.
256 See, e.g., CHAFEE, supra note 93, at 31-33.
257 See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in FirstAmendmentAnalysis,
54 STAN. L. REv. 737, 744 (2002).
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concern for absent effects cause us to impose protections so broad that we
undermine the First Amendment's knowledge-promoting function.
One important question is that raised in State v. 119 Vote No! Committee: are
there arenas, such as ballot propositions, in which we should be so concerned about
chilling effects that we should categorically protect all insincere speech?258 In Vote
No!, the Washington Supreme Court held that the state was categorically prohibited
from regulating even outright lies (false statements made with actual malice)
regarding factual issues relevant to ballot propositions because such speech did not
implicate private rights.5 9 Similarly, the Sullivan concurrences suggested that the
Court had not given enough protection to false political speech by imposing the
actual malice rule; the minority of Justices believed that the First Amendment
prohibited any restrictions on criticisms of public officials, even if those criticisms
were outright lies.26°
The problem with these suggestions is that they downplay the very real
epistemic harm that can be caused by insincere speech on issues of public
importance. As Professor Meiklejohn and others have noted, discussion of public
issues such as the conduct of public officials and the merits of ballot propositions
is critical to our ability to govern ourselves through the democratic process and
reach wise decisions.26' The central value at issue here is a listener interest, and it
is fundamentally epistemic in nature. We value discussion on such issues primarily
because it is likely to lead us to true conclusions; after all, we can hardly be
expected to govern effectively when we are relying on false premises.262 But as the
value of reaching true conclusions rises, the harm of believing lies increases as well.
If we value speech for its ability to help us reach informed deliberative conclusions
on matters of public concern, we should likewise be very concerned about deceptive
conduct aimed at undermining our ability to form accurate beliefs. Such deceptive
speech could include creating false evidence on matters of key public concern with
the intent to alter election results in order to advance a narrow private interest. It is
hard to imagine a form of private conduct that could have broader negative impact
258 See 957 P.2d 691, 697 (Wash. 1998).
259 Id. (citing Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to
Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 225, 238 (1992), for the proposition that the First Amendment
protects all speech that did not impinge on private rights).
260 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,293-96 (1964) (Black, J., concurring); id.
at 300 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
261 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 113, at 25 (noting that citizens must understand public
issues in order to vote wise decisions); SHIFFRIN, supra note 69, at 118 (emphasizing the
importance of accurate information to the value of encouraging dissent); Blasi, supra note
148, at 539 (emphasizing the importance of accurate public opinion as a check on
government power).
262 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 113, at 25-27 (noting the importance of information in
facilitating democratic self-governance).
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on the state of public knowledge or on democratic values more generally. Thus,
giving categorical protection to insincere speech on political topics would not accord
well with the First Amendment's knowledge promotion value,263 nor with any of the
First Amendment values that rely on furnishing accurate information to the citizenry.
There is a better means of avoiding chilling sincere speech when outlawing
insincere speech, however: the sort of procedural protections that the Supreme
Court has relied on in the defamation context. We should generally be cautious and
impose such protections only when necessary to prevent a significant chill on
protected speech. This determination will necessarily be contingent on complex
judgments about the specific types of speech being regulated and the degree to
which potential sincere speakers will hold their tongues rather than risk prosecution
or liability. Furthermore, we should not assume, without evidence, that speakers
will be significantly chilled just because they speak on topics for which they could
be liable if they were to speak insincerely; some survey research shows that media
speakers operating under the actual malice rule do not find themselves to be
significantly deterred by the threat of liability for insincere defamatory speech.2 64
There are essentially four useful categories of procedural rules that can reduce
the threat of harassing or frivolous litigation and lessen the risk of chilling protected
speech: (1) heightened burdens of pleading, (2) heightened burdens of production
and persuasion, (3) limitations on available damage awards, and (4) heightened
standards of appellate review. Each of these limitations has been applied in cases
involving insincere speech, and each may be appropriate in cases where we are
concerned about chilling effects.
Heightened burdens of pleading have often been used as a safeguard against
harassing or frivolous litigation. Such rules, in conjunction with restrictions on
making frivolous or unsupported statements in pleadings,26 ' effectively constrain the
ability of plaintiffs to impose costly discovery burdens on defendants when they do
not have substantial reasons for believing that bad conduct occurred before suing.
One example of such a rule employed in the context of restrictions on insincere
speech is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).266 Rule 9(b) imposes an exception
to the generally liberal notice pleading standards imposed by Rule 8.267 Rather than
requiring merely "a short and plain statement.., showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief,'' 268 which is the general standard in federal pleadings, Rule 9(b) imposes
263 See EMERSON, supra note 13, at 6-7.
264 See Weaver & Bennett, supra note 98, at 1185 (noting that, unlike their British
counterparts, American editors and publishers reported that the impact of potential defamation
liability was minimal with respect to their publishing decisions and that few reported having
ever killed a story or curtailed a statement out of worry for defamation liability).
265 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
266 FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
267 Compare id., with FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
268 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
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the additional requirement that, when asserting fraud, the claimant must state "with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud., 269 This rule requires plaintiffs
to allege, in detail, exactly which statement was fraudulent, and although a plaintiff
need not allege a basis for her belief that a statement is false or was made
insincerely,27° the specificity requirement nevertheless reduces the costs of defending
a lawsuit by giving the defendant early notice of precisely which statements are
alleged to be fraudulent. When combined with Rule lI's limitations on frivolous
assertions of fact in pleadings,27' such a rule can inhibit plaintiffs from filing strike
suits or other frivolous assertions of fraud,272 reduce the risk of reputational harms
273
and excess litigation costs for defendants, and thereby reduce the chilling effects of
civil liability.
Procedural safeguards against frivolous insincerity litigation need not stop at the
pleading stage. Another useful means of avoiding the chilling of sincere speech can
be to impose heightened burdens of persuasion and production. Raising the standard
of proof can help to ensure that fewer defendants will be erroneously found to have
uttered unprotected insincere statements when in fact those defendants believed
what they uttered. Thus, for instance, the clear and convincing evidence standard
can make it harder to obtain a judgment on the basis of insincere speech than the
normal civil standard of the preponderance of the evidence. 274 The clear and con-
vincing evidence standard of proof is frequently applied to insincerity claims, both
as a matter of common or statutory law, as in fraud claims, 275 and as a matter of First
Amendment law.276 When such heightened burdens of proof are interpreted as
269 FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b).
270 See Bankers Trust Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 677, 683 (7th Cir. 1992)
(describing the level of pleading needed to satisfy Rule 9(b)'s restrictions on claims of
misrepresentation).
271 FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (b)(3) (requiring that "the factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery").
272 See 1-9 MOORE'S MANUAL: FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 9.11(2)(b)
(discussing the purposes of Rule 9(b), which include preventing strike suits); Krista L.
Turnquist, Note, Pleading Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 98 MICH. L. REV.
2395, 2408 (2000) (discussing the prevention of strike suits as a Rule 9(b) purpose).
273 See Bankers Trust, 959 F.2d at 683 (stating that a primary value of Rule 9(b) is the
prevention of unwarranted reputational harm to fraud defendants); Turnquist, supra note 272,
at 2408 (same).
274 See John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REv.
1065, 1072 (1968) (noting that the clear and convincing evidence standard is properly
employed in cases where the harm of wrongfully finding a defendant liable exceeds the harm
of erroneously denying a plaintiff compensation).
275 See id.
276 Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 620 (2003); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 331-32 (1974); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389
U.S. 81, 83 (1967).
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imposing heightened production requirements as well,277 they can serve to enable
more frivolous cases to be resolved at the summary judgment stage, thus helping to
hold back the costs of litigation and their corresponding chilling effects. In addition
to reducing the frequency of wrongful judgments against those who speak sincerely,
such rules, by making claims based on insincere speech harder to prove, serve to
decrease the amount of litigation filed against speakers who might be subject to
chilling effects and thus can serve a salutary function in reducing those effects.
Standards of pleading and proof can only do so much, however, if we are afraid
that trial judges or juries may be overeager to find that particular speech is insincere,
perhaps as a way to punish speakers who urge unpopular viewpoints. If we are
worried that faulty verdicts may issue despite the existence of heightened proof
standards, another means of preventing sincere speech from being chilled by excessive
risks of liability is to impose more searching appellate review. The Supreme Court has
imposed just such a safeguard, requiring appellate courts to "exercise independent
judgment and determine whether the record establishes actual malice" to the level of
clear and convincing proof in public official defamation cases.278
Finally, there is one other way that the procedural law can limit the chilling
effect on sincere speech: through limits on the size of potential damage awards.
Limiting the size of potential damage awards can disincentivize plaintiffs from
pursuing lawsuits and thus can limit the risk of liability (and hence the chilling
effect) for sincere speakers who may nonetheless worry about costly litigation. In
some types of defamation cases, the Supreme Court has pursued such a strategy as
well, limiting the ability of states to impose presumptive or punitive liability and
requiring that damages represent actual proven harm to plaintiffs.279 Such a rule
may reduce the frequency with which speakers will be sued, a result that acts to
directly lessen the chilling effect on speech.280 Of course, such rules are very blunt
instruments, as they equally disincentivize suits against sincere and insincere
speakers. Nevertheless, by focusing lawsuits on actual harm, damage limitations do
enable the most seriously injured plaintiffs to maintain a remedy, while deterring
more speculative litigation (or strike suits) by lowering the value of claims that do
not involve grave harm. As we seek to strike a balance between deterring insincere
speech and limiting the chilling effects of litigation, tools that decrease the total
277 See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,252 (1986) (holding that the
clear and convincing evidence requirement in libel cases applies to the burden of production
on summary judgment, as well as to the necessary standard of persuasion at trial).
278 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984); see also
Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. at 621.
279 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50.
280 See Weaver & Bennett, supra note 98, at 1182-85 (noting that American media
companies, which are sued far less often than their British counterparts, experience a
correspondingly smaller concern for potential liability when deciding what to report).
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amount of litigation, while permitting the most serious suits to proceed, may
sometimes be the best we can do.
The four methods listed above-heightened burdens of pleading and proof,
heightened standards of appellate review, and limits on damage awards-all provide
potential rules by which courts can address the chilling effect on sincere speech
without totally cutting off liability for potentially destructive insincere speech. It
would be foolish to try to map out the precise application of such safeguards in all
possible cases here, as the inquiry is necessarily highly context dependent, requiring
close attention to the chill experienced by actual speakers in particular contexts.
Thus, these safeguards are offered more as a menu for courts to select from in trying
to resolve the difficult problems in the realm of regulating insincere speech than as
an attempt to impose a prix fixe solution across the wide range of situations courts
may encounter.
This Section has established that insincere speech should not generally be
constitutionally protected to the same high standard as innocently false speech
because insincere speech generally does not promote the increase of knowledge, but
rather, acts to inhibit that growth. Nor should we provide strong categorical pro-
tection for insincere speech as a means of avoiding its chilling effects on sincere
speech, given the potential of insincere speech to undermine important First
Amendment goals. Rather, courts should employ procedural methods of limiting
the chilling effect in situations where it is judged to be a danger, with a careful eye
towards weighing the epistemic benefits and costs of particular rules. Next, we will
consider the final piece of the puzzle: how should the First Amendment handle
speech that is not literally true or false, but rather misleading?
V. MISLEADING SPEECH IN FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY
For the most part, the fact that a meaning is implied rather than stated outright
does not alter the general analysis; speech that is misleading because it implies
something false should generally be protected, unless that implication is also
insincere. However, there are certain types of implicative relations that should be
immune from regulation altogether.
As discussed above, the use of language is a complex process, and people are
adept at using indirect means of communication to convey meaning.281 These
methods can be grouped and discussed under the concept of implicature, and they
include both common devices like metaphor and irony and other devices without
ready names.282 Given the diversity of such available means by which we can convey
non-literal messages, it is simply not plausible to suggest that the First Amendment
should only provide protections based on the literal meanings of speech; such a rule
281 See discussion supra Part II.B; see also Grice, supra note 130, at 165-75.
282 See discussion supra Part II.B.
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would both protect numerous statements that abuse implicature to harmful ends and
exclude from protection statements that might be literally deceptive but that were
understood by all parties to convey a sincere and truthful message.
When we call a message misleading, we are essentially saying that the message
conveys a false implicature. We ordinarily only refer to a message as implying
something if it contains an unspoken message that both speakers and listeners would
understand as implied given both the content of the message and its context. Such
implicatures have a great deal in common with ordinary communication. Although
they may use a more complex means of transmission," they are essentially just
another form of meaning conveyed through our speech and writing. Thus, it makes
sense to apply a similar set of rules to them as those we apply to normal speech.
After all, an implied message is just as capable of sparking debate, or of corrupting
it, as a directly expressed message.
Thus, we must unpack the concept of misleadingness into two subconcepts. If
speech is misleading when it conveys a false implication, then we can parse such
misleading speech into (1) speech that conveys an implied false statement, which
we can call propositionally misleading speech, and (2) speech that conveys an
implied insincere assertion, which we can call biographically misleading speech.2 4
Speech may be propositionally misleading, biographically misleading, or both, just
as speech may be false, insincere, or both.
For example, imagine that when asked, "Is your food made with organically
certified ingredients," a chef responds, "How can you even ask that? I only buy
from Splendid Natural Farms-it is a point of pride for me." Given the context of
the question being asked, the Maxim of Relation suggests that there is an implication
at work when the chef brings up Splendid Natural Farms-the implication that
Splendid Natural Farms is an organically certified grower. This implicature might
be false in several different ways. It could be propositionally misleading but
biographically accurate; in other words, the chef might earnestly believe that
Splendid Natural Farms is a certified organic grower but be mistaken in that
assumption. Likewise, it might be propositionally accurate but biographically
misleading; this would occur when the chef believed that Splendid was not an
organic grower (even though it actually was) and sought to mislead customers about
that belief. Finally, there is what might be called normally misleading speech: if
the chef rightly believes that Splendid is not on organic grower, but utters the above
statement which suggests otherwise, the statement is misleading on both the
propositional and the biographical level.
Having made this distinction, it is simple to fit misleading speech into the theory
thus far set forth. Thus, when speech is propositionally misleading, it should be
protected by the First Amendment because it will tend to cause little harm, because
283 See Grice, supra note 130, at 170-75.
284 See Smith, supra note 106, at 712-13.
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it may help to increase our knowledge by producing veritistically useful argument,
and because, like other forms of sincere speech, it serves important political theory
values.285 By contrast, whenever speech is biographically misleading, it should be
excluded from First Amendment protection for the same reasons that outright lies
are excluded, absent reason to think that procedural protections are needed in order
to prevent excessive chilling of sincere speech. Thus, the First Amendment inquiry
with respect to speech that is misleading resolves to the question of whether the
implied assertion is believed by the speaker or not.
The general exclusion of biographically misleading speech should extend across
all of what could be called "strong" implicatures: those implicatures that we
understand to be part of what a speaker generally intends to convey by his message.
Thus, such a principle would include both conventional implicatures 28 6 (implications
arising from subtle features of language) and conversational implicatures 28 7
(implications arising from conspicuous violations of standard conversational rules).
Both of these forms of implicature would be included because both form part of our
shared understanding of what people mean, in a broader sense, by what they say.2 8
There is another way that we use the term "implied" that does not share this
important feature of the implicatures discussed above. Thus, if a friend told us that
he was about to depart from New York for London, we might say that he had
implied that he was going to fly there. Such a conclusion would not follow auto-
matically from what our friend had said; after all, it is still possible to cross the
Atlantic on a ship. Rather, we would say that it was "implied" because people
generally do not cross the Atlantic by any other means than air anymore; thus, our
friend's statement gave us a high degree of confidence in the subsequent belief that
he would be flying. We might describe this sort of implicative relation as "Bayesian
implicature," because it reflects the degree to which a change in belief in what our
friend directly told us produced a change in our estimates of the probability of other,
related propositions.28 9
There is a fine but important distinction between Bayesian implicatures and the
other types of implicature I have discussed thus far. The distinction is best seen
when we take the class of implicatures that most resemble Bayesian implicatures
and try to identify what distinguishes the two categories. Some conversational
implicatures are formed through the selective disclosure of information and have
285 See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
286 See Grice, supra note 130, at 166-67.
287 Id. at 167.
288 Thus, in none of the examples of these types of implicature given above would it be
meaningful to say that a speaker would not mean to communicate the message that is implied
through his statement. See discussion supra Part II.B.
289 See GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 111-15 (discussing the Bayesian model of estimating
related event probabilities).
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their implicative effect through the Maxim of Relation;290 the Splendid Farms
conversation is an example of this. What distinguishes the two cases? In the Splendid
Farms example, the context indicates that the relevance, and hence the meaning, of
bringing up Splendid Farms is produced by its interaction with the context of a
question about organic ingredients. In other words, we would normally understand
the implication that Splendid Farms was an organic producer as part of the broader
meaning of what was said to us by our hypothetical chef. By contrast, none of the
numerous (and probably uncountable) Bayesian implicatures derived from our
friend's message regarding his London trip are part of the broader meaning of his
utterance. We may infer from what he tells us that he is probably taking a plane trip
soon, that he will probably experience jet lag soon, or that he will probably be
staying in a hotel soon, and so on. This sort of inference relies on using what he has
told us as evidence to make predictions about other related facts about which he was
not speaking. The distinction is between implication via meaning and implication
via non-linguistic inference.
Like the stronger class of linguistic implicatures, the Bayesian implicatures can
be false as well as true. Thus, if our friend intends to proceed to London by dirigible,
the implication that he will be taking a plane will be false. Likewise, if we were to
take it as implied that he was asserting a plan to travel by airplane, his implication
would be insincere as well. However, unlike the other types of implicatures we have
discussed,29' it is hard to suggest that we generally intend to convey our agreement
with most of the Bayesian implications that might follow from our speech. If I
inform you that I am headed to the grocery store, there are surely dozens of other
facts that are made more likely by that suggestion.292 We would not, as a rule, say
that a speaker is misrepresenting his mental state if he fails to cancel many of them
because they do not come to mind or do not seem relevant to the exchange. Rather,
we would say merely that some of the potential implications of what was said turned
out not to be the case, without any sort of deception on the part of the speaker.
290 See text accompanying supra note 138.
291 See Grice, supra note 130, at 171-72 (describing conversational implicatures as those
which are conveyed by the exploitation of conversational maxims).
292 For instance, you might assume, based on the normal behavior of people who go
grocery shopping, that I am likely to drive to the store, that I am likely to use a shopping cart,
that I am likely to stock up on groceries for several days, or that I am likely to pay with a
credit or debit card. Any or all of these assumptions might be false without it being appro-
priate to label my statement as misleading; the falsification of any or all of these implications
might simply not be relevant to the purpose of our communication, if, for instance, I am
intending to convey merely that I will be present at the store and will be able to pick some-
thing up for you if you would desire it. See id. at 168-69 (listing the conversational maxims,
which generally only require that contributions be appropriately tailored to the goals of the
exchange, not that every possible false implication be explicitly cancelled by a speaker).
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These differences help to indicate why even speech that gives rise to Bayesian
implicatures that would not be believed by the speaker should receive constitutional
protection, absent insincerity in the underlying statement or the presence of a more
direct biographically misleading implicature. "Insincere" Bayesian implicatures will
generally be parasitic upon sincere (and often true) utterances that are not themselves
misleading, as in the above example. Thus, such utterances will normally produce
increases in our knowledge. Furthermore, the fact that Bayesian implicatures will not
normally be imputed as a belief of the speaker (at least not as having been asserted
as such by the speaker) means that they are unlikely to cause harm by introducing
false evidence with respect to the belief states of the speaker.293 Finally, speakers will
frequently (and probably mostly) produce false or "insincere" Bayesian implications
in perfect good faith, either through failing to realize that they are creating such
implicatures or through viewing such implicatures as irrelevant to the conversational
goals of either party. Thus, most "insincere" Bayesian implicatures will not involve
the risk of production of strategically unverifiable evidence that supports the exclusion
of directly insincere speech from the protections of the First Amendment.
One common type of Bayesian implicature involves selective disclosures made
by advocates of a particular view; such selectivity is, for instance, a common feature
of our litigation system. Often, attorneys who are constrained from asserting an
ultimate conclusion nevertheless adduce facts that might tend to suggest that
conclusion. For instance, lawyers are not permitted to assert facts that they know
to be false.294 Thus, an attorney who has been privately informed by his client that
she was present at the scene of a robbery would not ordinarily be permitted to argue
the opposite of that fact to a jury. Nevertheless, although the lawyer would be pro-
hibited from openly asserting that his client was absent, he is nevertheless allowed
to adduce facts into evidence that would suggest that to be the case.295 Such
selective advocacy is another form of a Bayesian implicature. The underlying facts
asserted are true and not misleading. They may induce a jury to make less accurate
likelihood estimates regarding the ultimate inference at stake; on the other hand, the
attorney might be wrong (his client, after all, may have lied) and the facts would
thus be contributing to a true inference by the jury. In the end, we value having the
jury consider the whole picture more than we worry about the harm that may be
caused by false Bayesian implications-and we rightly worry that without providing
293 See discussion supra Parts IH.A, III.B.3, L.A (emphasizing the risks inherent in the
asymmetric distortion of the available evidence when false evidence is introduced that is not
easily subject to falsification).
294 See MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 3.3(a)(1) (2007) (prohibiting a lawyer from
making a false statement of fact to a tribunal).
295 MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHics 217 (3d
ed. 2004) (noting that almost every commentator on lawyers' ethics believes that it is proper
for an attorney to cross-examine a witness who is offering truthful testimony in an attempt
to undercut her credibility).
1267
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
an incentive to an interested party to bring such facts forward, the jury would not
hear a number of facts that are relevant to their decision.296 Thus, selective disclosures
made during the course of advocacy represent an important class of Bayesian
implicatures and help to show the general principle: we gain more value by pro-
tecting even insincere Bayesian implicatures (and hence the sincere statements from
which they arise) than by requiring advocates to suppress true facts which would
tend to support conclusions they do not presently believe.
Thus, sincere and non-biographically misleading speech that generates
"insincere" Bayesian implicatures, unlike the stronger sort of biographically
misleading implicatures discussed above, should be protected by the First
Amendment. Likewise, speech that is propositionally misleading but that conveys
a message believed to be true by a speaker should generally receive First Amend-
ment protection. However, when speech is misleading with respect to a speaker's
belief state, it should be treated like other insincere speech and excluded from
protection, unless concerns regarding chilling effects make it appropriate to employ
procedural protections.297
VI. DOCTRINAL APPLICATIONS
Before concluding, it will be useful to take the principles developed above and
apply them to the current state of First Amendment law applicable to false,
insincere, and misleading speech, in order to assess how dramatic a change the
recognition of the benefits of false speech would work in the law. To the degree that
readers have been persuaded by my argument that false speech has constitutional
value, this analysis can also serve as a guide to reforming the law in a way that
better protects the free expression values inherent in it. In order to conduct this
survey, I will examine two key areas of doctrine and discuss the degree to which
they tend to inhibit the social pursuit of knowledge by the manner in which they
regulate falsity and insincerity: the First Amendment law of defamation and the
commercial speech rule from Central Hudson.
The foregoing sections have outlined the principles at stake in the application
of free expression principles to false, insincere, and misleading speech. False speech
should generally be protected, as it serves to increase our aggregate social
knowledge and furthers important values in moral and political theory. This
principle should be subject only to narrow exceptions in situations where argument
cannot be expected to perform its knowledge-promoting function. By contrast,
296 Yet another concern is that if faced with a rule outlawing any advocacy that would
support an outcome they did not believe to be true, advocates would keep themselves
deliberately in the dark in order to maintain their ability to advocate their preferred position.
See id. at 225.
297 See discussion supra Part IV.C.
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insincere speech should generally not receive constitutional protection, because it
is much less likely to increase our knowledge or further other First Amendment
values. In some circumstances, however, procedural safeguards may be useful in
order to prevent the regulation of insincere speech from chilling sincere speech.
Finally, misleading speech should be subject to regulation only when the implied
meanings conveyed by that speech would be insincere if communicated directly; the
falsity of such implied meanings should not usually exclude them from protection.
A. Defamation
The modem constitutional law applicable to defamation liability has the
following salient features. Although liability may be imposed for false statements
about ordinary citizens when those statements are made negligently, 298 when speech
concerns a public official or public figure, the speaker must utter it with "actual
malice" in order to be liable, which means either that he knows it is false or believes
it is probably false.299 Furthermore, the Court has imposed a number of procedural
safeguards to lessen the chilling effect of defamation liability on valuable speech,
including heightened burdens of proof,30° more searching appellate review of factual
determinations,30' and limitations on available damages. °2 However, the Court has
refused to extend the damages limitations to cases involving private plaintiffs in
which the false statements did not involve matters of "public concem"-in
particular, false statements concerning an individual consumer's creditworthiness
have been held to be of private and not public concern. 30 3 Finally, the Court has
imposed a sharp distinction between statements about facts and statements of
opinion, holding that the latter can never be a subject of defamation liability even
when made insincerely.3 °4
Some features of the existing framework correspond very closely with the rules
we might make if we were focused solely on promoting the growth of knowledge.
Thus, the actual malice rule is very similar to a rule permitting only insincere speech
to be punished. The actual malice rule excludes speech made with knowledge of
falsity or belief in probable falsity, and all such speech is insincere, as the implied
298 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
299 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); see St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731-33 (1968) (unpacking the meaning of reckless disregard and
defining it to mean belief in probable falsity).
310 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 331-32; Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 83
(1967).
301 See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984).
302 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50.
303 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,758-59 (1985).
304 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339 (stating that there is "no such thing as a false idea").
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assertion of belief would not correspond with a mental state of belief."5 However,
the use of insincerity as a dividing line would in fact permit slightly more speech to
be the subject for defamation liability than the actual malice rule, because an
assertion made when the speaker had in fact suspended belief does not involve
"belief in probable falsity"3" but does involve a harmful misrepresentation of belief.
I suspect that most of us would be fairly comfortable with such a revision in First
Amendment law. After all, a confident assertion of truth made when the speaker
actually has no idea whether the statement he makes is true or false closely corre-
sponds with the everyday meaning of "reckless disregard" for the truth307 and would
generally be regarded as corrosive to useful discourse.
However, the limitation of the actual malice rule to lawsuits brought by public
officials or public figures cannot be sustained under the analysis offered above.
Sincerely-believed false statements concerning private individuals may be just as
capable of provoking knowledge-augmenting argumentation as speech concerning
those who have sought out the limelight. Furthermore, the proliferation of means
of private electronic publication has given new resources to private persons seeking
to correct false statements made publicly about them. Although there might be some
types of defamation where a Gertz-like rule might be appropriate-for instance, in
cases where the nature of the initial false publication would make any subsequent
argument unlikely-a broad rule permitting liability for all negligently-made false
statements about private individuals would sweep far too broadly, including within
its ambit numerous statements that would be likely to drive veritistically useful
argument. Furthermore, given that the chilling effect applies with as much force to
speech about private persons as about public persons,30 8 and given the fact that our
respect for individual autonomy and self-realization 30 9 should not vary based upon
whether the speaker is discussing a private person or a public person, there are
strong reasons to apply the same rule-a rule protecting all sincere speech-to both
public and private-person defamation actions.
The varied use of procedural prophylactic rules designed to mitigate the chilling
of truthful speech can be justified under this Article's framework. 3l0 Even after
extending protection to all sincere speech, there is still a significant risk that some
sincere speech will be chilled by liability for insincere statements. Furthermore, the
nuanced and varied level of protections offered to date may indicate a useful attempt
to adapt these protections to varied levels of potential chilling effects. For instance,
denying damage limitations to those who speak insincerely concerning the financial
305 See discussion supra Part II.A.
" See discussion supra Part II.A.
307 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
308 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 360 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
31 See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
311 See discussion supra Part IV.C.
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data of other companies could probably be justified on the grounds that such
reporting is driven by strong financial motives and is unlikely to be significantly
chilled by the prospect of occasional punitive liability.311 However, the existence
of some possible exceptions of this type should not be construed too broadly; it is
probably wrong, for instance, to suggest that all commercial speakers are similarly
immune to chilling effects.312
Finally, however, the above analysis makes clear that the fact/idea dichotomy
requires some revision in order to properly further our interest in maximizing our
knowledge. The Court has focused on the fact that ideas cannot be provably false
as the basis for their absolute First Amendment protection, 313 and this initially makes
a certain amount of sense. Depending on how we define the term "idea," it might
be true that it is hard to conceive of an idea as being literally true or false; terms
such as "good" and "bad," "right" and "wrong" might not involve enough deter-
minate meaning to be capable of being assessed in terms of descriptive success, at
least until the particular usages being discussed are specified in terms of clearer
underlying conceptions.3 4 However, this theory offers a reason to protect "false"
ideas regardless of whether one believes that they lack determinate factual content.
The conclusion that false statements generally deserve protection for their contri-
bution to the growth of social knowledge eliminates a dichotomy between facts and
ideas in this respect: we should protect all false speech, whether it concerns ideas
311 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,758-59 (1985).
To be clear, it was ambiguous whether a jury finding of actual malice was given in Dun &
Bradstreet, and the Supreme Court did not rely on the possibility that such a finding might
have taken place. Id. at 752-53. However, given that the false representation concerning the
plaintiff's bankruptcy status had originated in the faulty analysis of one 17-year-old
employee of the financial reporting company defendant and given that this data was never
subjected to the usual verification procedures employed by that company, it would be quite
reasonable to infer that the company did not actually believe its reporting to be true, but
rather had no firm belief on the question at all. Id. at 752. Thus, the facts of the case, if not
its procedural posture, could easily have supported liability based upon insincerity (because
it might be possible for a jury to infer on those facts that the company had no real belief in
the truth or falsity of its report). If such had been the case, it might well have been
appropriate to deny some procedural protections to the financial reporting company, given
that such companies are in the direct business of providing information, are generally quite
dedicated to doing so truthfully, and are unlikely to be chilled significantly by being liable
for making insincere statements.
312 See, e.g., Kozinski & Banner, supra note 60, at 635-38 (noting that in many cases com-
mercial speakers may be as easy to deter from speaking sincerely as non-commercial speakers).
313 See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
314 See generally W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 167 (1956) (discussing the degree to which a number of commonly-
used, value-laden concepts may lack broadly-shared conceptions of meaning and the degree
to which arguments over the use of these terms may be arguments about their definitions as
much as arguments about their application).
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or facts, because nearly all false statements will help to drive knowledge-producing
argumentation. Thus, this theory offers a basis for protecting false ideas that can appeal
to those who believe that such ideas are capable of determinate falsity and who worry
that permitting the discussion of false ideas will lead to an increase in false beliefs." 5
Nevertheless, although in one sense this theory supports the impulse to insulate
false ideas from suppression, it also provides a basis for curtailing the present extent
of the fact/opinion dichotomy: specifically, its total protection for even the insincere
expression of ideas. An understanding of the way we use implicative meaning
indicates that any time we assert an idea, we also assert a fact; we imply that we
believe the idea we are asserting to be true.316 This type of information about the
attitudes and ideas others subscribe to can have great social value; although we
might in some cases wish to carefully consider the use of strong procedural
protections in order to avoid the abuse of such litigation, the specter of insincere
expression of ideas has potentially very harmful implications. It would be distressing,
for instance, to conclude that the Constitution provides protection to a pundit who
insincerely promoted the ideas of a candidate for office as having merit in return for
kickbacks from that candidate. Given that it is hard to see what First Amendment
values might be served by protecting such speech and given that the false reporting
of attitudes can cause social harm-for instance, by inducing members of the public
to make voting or purchasing decisions that they would not make absent hearing the
insincere expression of certain opinions-it is hard to justify protection for such
speech on free expression grounds.
In short, the constitutional law applicable to defamation cases would not be very
much altered if redesigned so as to protect false speech while permitting insincere
speech to be significantly restricted. The amount of protection offered by the actual
malice rule would narrow slightly (because ignorance would no longer be an
effective defense) but would cover an expanded set of cases; the procedural safe-
guards built to prevent chilling truthful speech would largely survive as a means of
preventing the chilling of sincere speech; and the fact/opinion dichotomy would
cease to exist, given that false opinions would be protected, like all other false
speech, while insincere opinions would be excluded, like other insincere statements.
In practice, the alteration to case outcomes will likely be modest, as many cases in
315 Cf Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no
doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you
naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by
speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a man says that he has
squared the circle, or that you do not care whole-heartedly for the result, or that you doubt
either your power or your premises.").
316 See Grice, supra note 130, at 167-69 (discussing the maxim of quality and its standard
use to convey our belief in our own statements); Smith, supra note 106, at 712-13
(discussing the dual nature of most assertions).
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which a speaker would previously have been found negligent (through a lack of
adequate objective basis for a false statement) would also involve the sort of investi-
gative failure that would prevent most speakers from forming affirmative beliefs that
correspond with their assertions. The primary effect of this change will be to give
speakers who earnestly believe what they are saying immunity from liability based
upon others' disagreement with their conclusions.
B. Commercial Speech
A more radical intervention will be required to bring the commercial speech
doctrine into line with a better understanding of the value of false speech. This should
not be very surprising, given that this doctrine arose primarily from the Court's
previous conclusion in Gertz that false speech had no independent constitutional
value;3"7 this assertion was both unsupported318 and-as we have seen-incorrect.1 9
The Court's decision to exclude false commercial speech from protection therefore
flowed largely from its view that such speech was less likely to be chilled by
liability,320 a conclusion that is not itself free from doubt.32' Thus, the broad
exception from protection for all commercial speech that is false, misleading, or
deceptive, without regard for the state of mind of the speaker, flows entirely from
an underanalyzed and erroneous premise.
Furthermore, the Court has never needed to put its money where its mouth is
regarding this remarkably broad exclusion. There is not a single case on record in
which the Court has had to decide whether to stick with its stated doctrine in a case
where a commercial speaker is held liable for speaking sincerely, absent additional
reasons to exclude speech from protection.322 The closest the Court has come has
been in the attorney advertising cases, in which the Court-without making findings
of insincerity-has been willing to uphold professional conduct regulations that
prevent attorneys from soliciting clients in person, due in part to concerns about
possible deception.323 However, the animating concern in these cases has been a
fear of coercion and fraud, not a worry that lawyers would communicate innocent
317 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 331-32 (1974).
318 See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
319 See discussion supra Part III.B.
320 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,564 n.6
(1980); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979).
321 See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 60, at 635-38 (criticizing this argument).
322 See discussion supra Part I.A.2; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 1054 (noting
that the Court "has never decided a First Amendment case concerning false and deceptive ads").
323 See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 465-66 (1978) (expressing
concern that "unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay person[s]" would tend to fall prey
to coercion by lawyers, who are after all "professional[s] trained in the art of persuasion").
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or negligent errors to potential clients. 24 Furthermore, such cases can be amply
explained as time, place, and manner restrictions aimed at protecting the privacy of
distressed laypeople; 32 after all, the Court has based its case law in this area in part
on the concern that "the overtures of an uninvited lawyer may distress the solicited
individual simply because of their obtrusiveness and the invasion of the individual's
privacy ' 326 and has held that mail solicitations (which are certainly equally capable
of containing false or misleading information) are protected by the First Amend-
ment.327 Thus, this line of cases is better read as expressing a concern about privacy
than as applying anything like the strong rule announced in Central Hudson,328 and
it remains the case that the Court has never yet tested its willingness to permit the
restriction of sincerely believed false or misleading commercial speech.329
Although the Court has never tested its present doctrine, its stated rule has had
an enormous and detrimental effect, permitting widespread restrictions of com-
mercial messages solely on the basis of disagreement with the message that an
advertiser wishes to convey. To take but one example, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) enforces regulations designed to limit
false or misleading advertising regarding wines.33 Under these regulations, the ATF
takes the enforcement position that any claim that wine may have health benefits-
regardless of its support in evidence-is factually misleading unless it purports to
give all sides of the issue, listing all the possible ways in which such a statement
might not hold true.33' As a result, wine makers are generally restrained from
imparting the truthful information that there is mounting evidence to support the
claim that red wine consumed in moderate quantities reduces the risk of cardiac
illness.332 This is the extent of what current Supreme Court doctrine has wrought:
consumers are prevented from hearing true information from companies that sell
324 See id.
325 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding restrictions on truck-mounted
loudspeakers as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction).
326 Ohralik, 336 U.S. at 465.
327 Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
328 See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
329 The only other plausible candidate as an application of this principle is Friedman v.
Rogers, which involved restrictions on the use of trade names by optometrists. 440 U.S. 1,
10 (1979). Friedman does not truly test the Court's willingness to prohibit sincere-but-false
speech, however, because trade names do not, in and of themselves, communicate messages
that can be true or false, and because the Court's concern was clearly the deceptive use of
trade names, not their erroneous use (whatever that might mean). See id. at 13.
330 See 27 U.S.C. § 205 (2000); 27 C.F.R. § 4.39 (2007).
133 See Dep't of Treas., ATF, Health Claims in the Labeling and Advertising ofAlcoholic
Beverages, Industry Circular 93-8 (1993), available athttp://www.ttb.gov/industry-circulars/
archives/1993/93-08.html.
332 Lawrence M. Fisher, Here's to the Benefits of Red Wine, but Don't Advertise Them,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 25, 2006, at Cl.
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products with demonstrated health benefits because the government can threaten
anyone who advocates a particular factual assertion with a lawsuit. And this merely
scratches the surface; there are strict liability rules against misrepresentations, often
leaving substantial discretion to government enforcers to decide what is false, across
an enormous swath of business regulations,333 as well as at common law.334
The better rule for commercial cases is the same as that announced above: false
but sincere commercial speech should generally receive protection, while speech that
is either directly insincere, or insincere via implication, should be properly subject to
regulation. Such a rule resonates well with the Court's expressed respect for the
informational value of advertising335 by promoting discussion that will tend to provide
the public with greater information than a rule penalizing advertisers for saying what
they believe. At the same time, it permits the government to prevent advertisers from
deliberately misleading the public, either directly or through subtle implications.
To state this as a general rule, however, is not to preclude the possibility of some
narrow exceptions. First, as discussed above,336 when circumstances suggest that a
particular class of false statements is not likely to give rise to useful argumentation,
and when such statements have the potential to cause significant harm, such
statements may properly be excluded from First Amendment protection, at least
when some level of fault, such as negligence, is involved. A classic example of such
a situation is when a confidential advisor, such as an attorney, is retained to provide
accurate and competent advice that will be relied upon by a client without further
inquiry. In such a case, argument is unlikely to be produced by errors in the
advisor's counsel, and thus the benefits of false speech are unlikely to materialize.
Therefore, such statements may lie outside the zone of protection for false
commercial speech.337
A second class of potential exceptions may lie in cases where a localized
increase in false belief may have very serious consequences and opposing arguments
131 See, e.g., 15. U.S.C. § 45 (2000) (making deceptive acts that affect commerce
unlawful); Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12, 48 Stat. 74 (1934) (creating strict liability for
various types of misrepresentations in the sale of securities) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (2000)); 15 U.S.C. § 1679b(a)(1) (2000) (creating strict liability for
any false statement made with respect to a consumer's creditworthiness to any credit-
reporting agency). See generally Aleta G. Estreicher, Securities Regulation and the First
Amendment, 24 GA. L. REv. 223,266-67 (1990) (discussing the Federal Trade Commission's
power to restrain false and misleading advertising).
311 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C (1977); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS app. § 552C (1989) (listing cases imposing liability for innocent
misrepresentations in an exchange, sale, or rental transaction).
331 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
336 See discussion supra Part IlI.B.4.
311 See GREENAWALT, supra note 97, at 316 (implicitly suggesting that such speech may
be unprotected).
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are unlikely to reach listeners in time to avoid such harms.33' A classic example of
this might involve warning labels on over-the-counter medications. I doubt that
most of us could keep track of which medications did or did not cause drowsiness
based upon claims made in advertising; rather, when an illness strikes, selection is
often made at the point of purchase, based on labeling claims made on each
competing medication. Nevertheless, the risk of adverse consequences flowing from
a manufacturer's overconfident decision that its medicine did not cause an
unacceptable level of drowsiness or did not interact negatively with certain other
drugs, might create significant dangers to the health of consumers before they could
encounter counterspeech from the government or health-advocacy organizations.
Left unchecked, the risk to health might well outweigh any informational gains from
the false label claims.
Nevertheless, the appropriate remedy in such a case would not be suppression of
the false claim, but rather finding a way for the regulator to assert its own beliefs
without denying advertisers the ability to make their own claims. Such compelled
speech (either the seller might be compelled to include certain information on the
label, or the retailer might be compelled to include certain information at the point of
purchase) should not require anyone to assert false facts regarding their own belief
states; this would distort the available information to consumers, who do after all
have an interest in knowing that these claims of harm are disputed by the manufac-
turer.339 Rather, a warning could be clearly labeled as coming from an appropriate
regulatory body, with a manufacturer being permitted to dispute the government's
contentions if it wished to do so. Such a resolution would permit many of the gains
of argumentation to persist, while avoiding the risk of having consumers rely on
potentially dangerous, false information due to lack of counterspeech.
Finally, it could be argued that commercial speech as a class should be treated
differently, because manufacturers and advertisers as a class generally have much
greater access to information about their products than possible critics do. To some
extent, this unequal access might represent the kind of informational disparity that
could impede the ability of critics to assure that the evidence premises underlying
arguments made in commercial speech are generally true.34° Indeed, the Court has
often adverted to such a distinction as a basis for the lessened protection of com-
mercial speech.TM ' However, as discussed above, a rule absolutely suppressing false
speech on this account would be less veritistically desirable than a rule requiring
disclosure but permitting advocacy of sincerely-believed viewpoints, whether false
338 See discussion supra Parts III.A, III.B. 1.
... See discussion supra Part lI.B.4 (discussing the value of knowing when expert opinion
is divided).
o See GOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 146-47.
3 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 564 n.6 (1980).
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or otherwise. 42 In other words, it is better to have access both to commercial speakers'
beliefs, and the evidence they use to support those beliefs, than to have them decline to
speak rather than be sued for making a false statement.
Subject to these narrow exceptions, commercial speech should be subject to the
same regime as all other speech: sincere falsity should generally receive constitu-
tional protection, while insincerity should be outside the scope of First Amendment
coverage. This discussion has merely scratched the surface of the existing law
regulating false speech; there are numerous areas involving false or insincere speech
that have not traditionally been scrutinized for compliance with the First Amend-
ment at all.343 Although the general principles offered above should remain sound
as applied to new cases, it is possible that there will be unique facts in each
domain-such as the special concerns discussed regarding commercial speech-that
may alter the veritistic calculus and change the proper assessment of the costs and
benefits involved in First Amendment values in each domain. The important thing
is to avoid facile assumptions that false speech is always harmful 3" and instead
assess the regulation of speech in a way that pays attention to the modes of discourse
in which that speech is situated, noting the degree to which seemingly useless
statements may be embedded in, and necessary to, a larger conversation that is
valuable. Given the analysis offered above, it would be the gravest mistake to assume
that we can generally restrict false messages without also constraining the processes
of argumentative discourse that need error to exist and that contribute usefully to all
of our knowledge.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to set forth a theory of the First Amendment's
application to false, insincere, and misleading speech. The theory can be restated
as follows. First, false speech that is sincerely uttered should generally be protected,
for reasons grounded both in political theory and in its ability to generate argumen-
tation that will usually increase the sum of our knowledge. This rule is subject to
narrow exceptions, however, for circumstances where argument cannot be relied
upon to serve a corrective function. Second, insincere speech is generally harmful
to the state of our knowledge, and the First Amendment therefore puts forward no
barrier to its suppression, except to the extent that suppressing insincere speech will
chill sincere speech. The concern with chilling effects is an important one, but it
should be addressed through procedural safeguards than through rules giving full
342 See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
313 Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1765, 1767-68 (2004).
3" See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 1054 ("False and deceptive advertisements
do not contribute to the marketplace of ideas.., in any useful way.").
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protection to insincere speech, given the very grave harm that such speech can
cause. Third and finally, speech that is misleading should be protected if the implied
assertions are false but believed by the speaker, but such speech should not be
protected when those implied assertions are not believed by the speaker to be true,
with the caveat that implications that proceed solely through the ability of facts to
convince listeners of other, related facts that are not the subject of communication
should not be permitted to generate liability.
At one level, this Article has been a project in First Amendment theory, with the
aim of providing a starting point for understanding how free expression principles
interact with the many ways that speech can be incorrect or improper in its relation
to truth and belief. To this end, I have attempted to apply basic concepts from the
fields of social veritistic epistemology and the philosophy of language in order to
provide a more systematic way to assess the relationship between First Amendment
goals and restrictions on false or insincere speech. At the same time, however, this
project also may be useful towards more doctrinal ends. To date, the First
Amendment doctrine applicable to insincere or false speech has been underdevel-
oped, and what development that has occurred has been inconsistent and often
pronounced with little grounding in First Amendment principles. The theory offered
here provides a straightforward means by which courts can fill the gaps in existing
law and also provides suggestions for the rationalization of existing law so as to
better protect the types of deceptive speech that have First Amendment value.
Indeed, the theory could be implemented without the necessity of overruling many
existing Supreme Court precedents in this area; almost the only cases with holdings
that cannot be justified under these rules are those cases refusing to extend the actual
malice rule to defamation cases brought by plaintiffs who are not public officials or
public figures.345
Certainly much work remains to be done in this area. In particular, the proper
boundaries and scope of the procedural protections we should give to insincere
speech to avoid chilling sincere speech is a question that deserves significant further
investigation. 6 At the least, however, I hope this Article demonstrates the need for
a more critical approach to these questions and that it may put to rest the facile
assumption that all false statements of fact are without constitutional value. 34 7
311 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974).
346 See discussion supra Part IV.C.
341 See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 ("[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements
of fact."); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 1054 ("False and deceptive advertisements do
not contribute to the marketplace of ideas or the commercial marketplace in any useful
way."); GREENAWALT, supra note 97, at 48 ("[T]he contribution to understanding that most
demonstrably false statements make is highly limited.").
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